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Abstract
In this work we provide alternative formulations of the con-
cepts of lambda theory and extensional theory without in-
troducing the notion of substitution and the sets of all, free
and bound variables occurring in a term. We also clarify
the actual role of α–renaming and η–extensionality in the
lambda calculus: both of them can be described as proper-
ties of extensionality for certain classes of terms.
1 Introduction
In the early thirties, Church [11] introduced a formal sys-
tem intended to provide a common foundation for logic
and mathematics. However, after the discovery of some
paradoxes, a proper portion of the original system was
extracted. This part constitutes what is known as the
lambda calculus today; see Church [13], Curry and Feys
[19], Curry, Hindley and Seldin [20], Stenlund [48], Stoy
[50], Barendregt [5], Révész [42], Krivine [30], Hankin
[24], Sørensen and Urzyczyn [47], Hindley and Seldin
[26], Cardone and Hindley [10] and Seldin [45] for good
expositions.
In a nutshell, the lambda calculus can be described as a
general theory of computable functions: it provides a for-
malism for dealing with functions–as–terms in the context
of the foundations of mathematics: In axiomatic set theo-
ries, functions from a given set to itself are defined by their
graphs as — typically infinite — sets of ordered pairs. By
contrast, in the lambda calculus functions are simply im-
plemented by means of some —always finite — formal ex-
pressions called terms. Furthermore, in set theory it follows
from the axioms that a function cannot be a member of its
domain. In the lambda calculus, every term is in the do-
main of a given function; in particular, every function can
take itself as input.
The most interesting feature of this calculus is that it con-
stitutes a model of computation and for this reason this
powerful language is the theoretical core of many modern
functional programming languages.
To be more precise, the lambda calculus in itself has no
expressive power at all. It becomes an expressive language
only when equipped with a suitable relation which allows
us to determine when two terms are intended to be the
same. While in set theory two functions from a given set
to itself are the same if they have identical input–output
behaviour, in the lambda calculus the situation is rather dif-
ferent; there is a huge collection of relations called lambda
theories and each of these relation is intended to capture
some notion of sameness.
A little more technically, lambda theories are congru-
ences on terms which satisfy the conditions of α–renaming
and β–rule. The two most important lambda theories are
lambda conversion — the least lambda theory — and ex-
tensional conversion — the least lambda theory which also
satisfies the condition of η–extensionality. Here we adopt
the Church’s terminology [13]; other names for lambda
conversion and extensional conversion are αβ–equality and
αβη–equality, respectively. In order to avoid misunder-
standing, in this paper we call α–renaming, β–rule and η–
extensionality the conditions that in the literature are usu-
ally denoted by (α), (β) and (η). Since several versions of
(α), (β) and (η) have been proposed, for the sake of clarity
we use our terminology when we do not refer to a specific
formulation. We reserve the names (α), (β) and (η) to the
particular conditions that will be introduced in Section 7.
In general, each lambda theory has to be seen as a reason-
able relation of sameness for terms. We refer to Barendregt
[5], Berline [6, 7] and Manzonetto and Salibra [32] for a
survey of results on lambda theories.
In this paper we focus our attention on the syntactical
formalizations of the notions of lambda theory and exten-
sional theory— we call extensional theory any lambda the-
ory which also satisfy η–extensionality. The usual way to
proceed is to introduce some auxiliary notions first:
• the sets of all, free and bound variables occurring in a
term,
• a meta–theoretic operation of substitution.
Henceforth, we refer to these auxiliary notions as ancillary
concepts. Note that they usually occur, explicitly or implic-
itly, in the traditional formulations of the conditions of α–
renaming, β–rule and η–extensionality. One of the aims of
this paper is to show that
in order to syntactically define lambda and exten-
sional theories it is not necessary to introduce any
ancillary concept.
Regarding our motivations, we mention that it is well–
known that the usual definition of substitution is intrinsi-
cally difficult and error–prone. The same problems also
arise in logics with quantifiers and more generally in lan-
guages with binding operators. As for the lambda calculus,
we believe that the actual complications do not lie in the op-
eration of substitution itself but rather in the formulation of
the β–rule. In fact, it is not so well–known that it is possible
to consider a simple definition of substitution at the price
of having some restrictions in the β–rule. This is the ap-
proach of Barendregt’s dissertation [4], which is actually
a more elegant variant of the original approach developed
by Church [13]. By contrast, following Curry and Feys [19],
the vast majority of the presentations of the lambda calcu-
lus prefers to consider a complicated notion of substitution
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which allows a simple formulation of the β–rule. In Section
7 we shall compare the two options in more detail. But in
either case, we believe it is definitely more convenient to
not consider substitution at all and replace the β–rule with
the more elementary conditions we shall introduce later on.
Historically, these complications were well–known to the
fathers of modern formal logic. In fact, approximately in
same period the lambda calculus was conceived, a way to
circumvent the problems caused by substitution was pro-
posed by Shönfinkel [46] and Curry [18, 19, 20] under the
name of combinatory logic. However, we think that in such
a framework the elimination of concepts is too drastic: the
ancillary concepts are eliminated by means of the rejection
of the notion of (bound) variable. As a negative side ef-
fect, in that setting the “functional intuitions” coming from
the lambda notation are completely lost. This is not an ac-
cident, since this elimination of variables was one of the
objectives of Shönfinkel (see Cardone and Hindley [10] for
a survey of Shönfinkel’s work). By contrast, in this paper
we want to maintain the syntax of the lambda calculus un-
altered and perform a more precise surgery which allows
us to eliminate only the ancillary concepts.
Regarding the sets of all, free and bound variables occur-
ring in a term, we see these concepts as mere “syntactic bu-
reaucracy” without any realmathematical substance. As we
shall see, these sets can be eliminated from the picture with
almost no effort and hence in this way more elegant for-
mulations of the notions of lambda theory and extensional
theory can be obtained.
In addition to the theoretical and pedagogical interest
of our results, we also see a more concrete advantage as
we now explain. In the model theory of the lambda cal-
culus, in order to prove that a given mathematical struc-
ture is a model of, say, lambda conversion, all we need to
do is to check that the binary relation obtained by relat-
ing terms which have the same interpretation in the given
structure — the relation usually called theory of a model —
is a lambda theory. In equivalent words, we have to prove
a soundness theorem. To show this theorem, a typical ap-
proach is to prove the substitution lemma, see Wadsworth
[54] and Meyer [33], as well as Stoy [50, pp. 161–166]
for a detailed proof of this lemma. We believe that a direct
verification of the substitution–free conditions which define
(our formulation of) lambda theories is not only easier than
the lemma, but also more convenient inasmuch as the proof
— and the exportability — of the lemma largely depends
on the specific definition of substitution. (In particular, the
substitution lemma cannot be simply invoked by authors
who use a different notion of substitution. Unfortunately,
we also believe that this delicate point has been overlooked
by many authors.) To convince the reader, a direct verifi-
cation of some of our substitution–free conditions will be
given in Section 9.
In order to avoid terminological misunderstandings, in
the rest of the paper the relations of sameness on terms de-
fined by using our formalizations are called lambda and ex-
tensional congruences, while we exclusively reserve the ter-
minology lambda and extensional theory for the traditional
axiomatizations of these relations. Then, one of our main
results can be stated as follows:
lambda congruences and lambda theories coincide,
as well as extensional congruences and extensional
theories.
Another aspect we want to analyze in this paper is the
precise role of α–renaming and η–extensionality in the
lambda calculus. As for the latter, it is well–known that
this condition allows us to consider terms which have the
same input–output behaviour as the same. Thus, expressed
in this form η–extensionality has a very intuitive and sat-
isfactory mathematical significance: it reproduces in the
lambda calculus a form of extensionality familiar from or-
dinary set theory. As for the former, the situation is not so
clear. To the best of our knowledge, the most intuitive in-
formal description of this concept is this: terms which only
differs in the names of bound variables should be considered
as the same. We think that this explanation is too syntac-
tical — it even mentions an ancillary concept! — and we
do not see any clear mathematical content in it. One of the
aim of this paper is to clarify the meaning of α–renaming
in intuitive and mathematically reasonable terms. It turns
out that α–renaming admits the following simple and sat-
isfactory equivalent description:
abstractions which have the same input–output be-
haviour should be considered as the same,
as we shall show in Section 5. Here “abstractions” are,
roughly speaking, terms which begin with a λ. Thus, α–
renaming can be regarded as a form of extensionality for ab-
stractions. We believe that when expressed in this form the
real mathematical significance of this condition emerges.
To obtain the aforementioned results we have to consider
a new factorization of the conditions which define lambda
and extensional theories, in the sense we now explain. Con-
sider, for instance, lambda theories. Following Church [13],
a way of introducing this concept is to put α–renaming and
the β–rule together in the definition of these theories, like
in the original formulation of lambda conversion. Follow-
ing Barendregt [5], another approach is to define an auxil-
iary equivalence relation on terms called alpha conversion.
Termswhich belongs to the same equivalence class are then
identified. After this identification, substitution and the β–
rule are finally introduced. We refer to Crole [17] and the
references therein for more on alpha conversion.
Our factorization is completely different and, to the best
of our knowledge, it seems to be new. Roughly speaking,
we obtain it by proceeding as follows. First, we only con-
sider our substitution–free version of the β–rule. We obtain
a family of relations that we call prelambda congruences.
These relations need to satisfy neither α–renaming nor η–
extensionality; in fact, we shall show is that there exists
a prelambda congruence in which both conditions do not
hold. Only at this stage we add α–renaming to prelambda
congruences. We then obtain our version of lambda theo-
ries: lambda congruences. We shall prove that
α–renaming and the property of extensionality for
abstractions mentioned above are equivalent in ev-
ery prelambda congruence.
Also, we add η–extensionality to prelambda congruences
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and get our version of extensional theories: extensional con-
gruences. Similarly, we shall prove that
η–extensionality and the property of extensionality
(for all terms) mentioned above are equivalent in
every prelambda congruence.
Notice that these equivalences are significant precisely be-
cause neither α–renaming nor η–extensionality is valid in
every prelambda congruence.
Regarding our methodology, our analysis of α–renaming
and η–extensionality in the lambda calculus is somehow in-
spired by the usual treatment of classical logic from a con-
structive point of view. In that context, intuitionistic logic
is first introduced and developed. Only at a second stage,
the law of excluded middle is motivated, discussed and
added, and some equivalent formulations are established
— such as double negation elimination. Equivalents of ex-
cluded middle are of interest precisely because this law is
not a theoremof intuitionistic logic. Of course, α–renaming
and η–extensionality are by no means “controversial” in
the lambda calculus as excluded middle is in constructive
mathematics, but we do believe they deserve a better un-
derstanding as they are too often taken “for granted” in
the literature, especially α–renaming. One of the aims of
this paper is to provide a more intuitive and clear compre-
hension of these conditions. To sum up, the result of our
analysis is that
in every prelambda congruence both α–renaming
and η–extensionality can be both described in a nat-
ural way as properties of extensionality.
This completes the description of this paper.
We nowdiscuss some relatedwork. As far we know, there
are three lines of apparently independent research which
implicitly or explicitly try to eliminate the ancillary con-
cepts without modifying the syntax of the lambda calculus.
In the sixties, following some ideas of Church [12],
Henkin introduced a theory of propositional types based on
the simply typed lambda calculus [25]. In order to develop
a deductive system for his theory, Henkin decomposed the
typed β–rule in several substitution–free clauses which are
strikingly similar to the conditions that we use in this pa-
per. The reason for this decomposition was the simplifica-
tion of the proof of the soundness theorem of his deduc-
tive system with respect to the set–theoretic semantics of
his type theory. Again, here we see strong similarities be-
tween his and ourmotivations. Following Henkin, Andrews
employed similar clauses in his work on type theory [2, 3].
However, some ancillary concepts are present in all these
works.
In the early eighties, Révész [40, 41, 42] proposed a
substitution–free formalization of lambda conversion. His
and our motivations are rather similar, the main differ-
ence is that he was mainly interested in developing con-
crete computer implementation while we also think that
substitution–free formalizations are also useful to simplify
some practical aspects of the model theory of the lambda
calculus — namely, the elimination of the substitution
lemma. Révész’s conditions are very similar to (untyped
versions) of Henkin’s ones and in particular some ancillary
concepts are still present in his formalization. From an his-
torical perspective, the main novelty of his work was the
first substitution–free formulation of α–renaming.
Some years later, with the aim of providing a general al-
gebraic setting for the lambda calculus, Pigozzi and Salibra
[36, 37, 38] introduced the theory of lambda abstraction al-
gebras. Despite the aims of this line of work are completely
different from ours, from a purely syntactical standpoint
the improvement emerging from the introduction of these
algebras is the complete elimination the ancillary concepts.
In fact, the conditions defining lambda abstraction algebras
are very similar to those we introduce in this paper, as we
shall see.
We finally point out that the conditions we use in this
paper to define lambda and extensional congruences do not
form just a selection of clauses taken from these works. On
the contrary, the crucial conditions (β5), (αe) and (ηe) that
we use in this paper are simplified — for our purposes —
reworked versions of some similar clauses present in the
aforementioned literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we shall
recall the syntax of the terms of the lambda calculus and
introduce some notation and terminology. In Section 3 we
shall introduce the concept of prelambda congruence and
in Section 4 we shall study the basic properties of this no-
tion. In Section 5 we shall discuss the real — for us — rea-
sonwhyα–renaming is so important in the lambda calculus
and introduce the concept of lambda congruence. We shall
also prove that in every prelambda congruenceα–renaming
is equivalent to a suitable principle of extensionality. Simi-
larly, in Section 6 we shall define the notion of extensional
congruence and prove that in every prelambda congruence
η–extensionality is equivalent to a principle of extension-
ality. In Section 7 we shall recall the concepts of lambda
and extensional theory and in Section 8 we shall prove the
equivalence between lambda congruences and theories as
well as the one between extensional congruences and theo-
ries. In Section 9 we shall provide a construction of a model
whose theory forms a prelambda congruence which do not
satisfy a simple instance of α–renaming. Finally, in Section
10 we shall conclude the paper.
2 The Lambda Calculus
In this section we recall the syntax of the terms of the
lambda calculus and introduce some terminology.
Definition 2.1 (Variables). Let V be an infinite set. We call
its member variables and we denote them by x, y, z,. . . . △
Some comments concerning the set V are given at the
end of this section.
The basic elements of the lambda calculus are called
terms. They are special words built from the infinite alpha-
bet consisting of all variables together with the following
auxiliary symbols: λ (lambda–abstractor), [ (left lambda–
bracket) and ] (right lambda–bracket). In this paper, we
write words by juxtaposition of symbols; in particular, we
do not notationally distinguish between members of the al-
phabet and unary words.
3
Lambda Congruences and Extensionality
Definition 2.2 (Term). The terms of the lambda calculus
are the elements of the set T which is inductively defined
as follows:
(T1) x ∈ V implies x ∈ T;
(T2) A ∈ T and B ∈ T imply [AB] ∈ T;
(T3) x ∈ V and A ∈ T imply [λxA] ∈ T.
In the sequel, we use A, B, C, . . . to denote arbitrary terms.
△
We now introduce some useful terminology and nota-
tion.
As is standard, two terms A and B are said to be equal,
in symbols A = B, if and only if A and B are exactly the
same word. In particular, we have x = y as elements of T if
and only if x = y as elements of V. Our notion of equality
corresponds to the relation which is often called syntactical
equality in the literature.
In order to save space, we always write AB and λxA for
[AB] and [λxA], respectively. Henceforth, we also refer to a
term of the form AB as an application and to a term of the
form λxA as an abstraction.
As usual, we call a subset of T2 (the Cartesian product
of T with itself) a binary relation on terms and we use the
symbol ∼ to denote binary relations on terms. We also
write A ∼ B for (A,B) ∈ ∼ and A 6 ∼ B for (A,B) /∈
∼ . Furthermore, if we have A ∼ B and B ∼ C, then
sometimes we simply write A ∼ B ∼ C to express this fact.
Analogously, we may write A ∼ B ∼ C ∼ D in case we
have A ∼ B, B ∼ C and C ∼ D, and so on.
An important class of binary relations on terms is that of
congruences, that we now formally define and discuss.
Definition 2.3 (Congruence, structural conditions). Let ∼
be a binary relation on terms. We say that ∼ is a congru-
ence if it satisfies the following conditions:
(r) A ∼ A;
(s) A ∼ B implies B ∼ A;
(t) A ∼ B and B ∼ C imply A ∼ C;
(ℓ) A ∼ B implies λxA ∼ λxB;
(a) A ∼ B and C ∼ D imply AC ∼ BD;
where A, B, C and D are arbitrary terms, and x is an arbi-
trary variable. We collectively refer to conditions (r) to (a)
above as structural conditions. △
Conditions (r), (s) and (t) ensure that any congruence
is an equivalence relation between terms, while conditions
(ℓ) and (a) express the fact that any congruence is a rela-
tion compatible with the operations of term formation (T2)
and (T3) of Definition 2.2. In particular, a congruence de-
fined as above is a congruence in the usual algebraic sense.
In other words, structural conditions are nothingmore than
a formalization of the algebraic principle usually called re-
placement of equals by equals. This principle — which is
ubiquitous in algebra — is often used in an implicit and
tacit fashion. In this paper, for the sake of clarity — but
in contrast to the algebraic tradition — we shall explicitly
mention when and where structural conditions are used in
formal proofs of our results.
While important, congruences alone cannot be consid-
ered as candidates for a good formalization of the notion
of sameness for terms: in fact, in order to develop a the-
ory of functions using the lambda calculus more conditions
are needed. This situation is similar to what happens for
the traditional presentations of sequent calculi for classical
logic in proof theory: there, in addition to structural rules,
we also need logical rules to be able to derive classical tau-
tologies in a syntactical way. In our context, “structural
rules” are, unsurprisingly, what we are calling structural
conditions and the “logical rules” specific to this work that
we shall introduce and discuss in detail in later sections are
(β1), (β2), (β3), (β4), (β5), (αe) and (ηe).
We now give an informal presentation of our logical rules.
In the lambda calculus, the functional intuition on terms is
this: an abstraction of the form λxA should be thought as a
function depending on the variable x. If, for a moment, we
think ofA as the polynomial 2x+y, then λxA represents the
function given by f(x) = 2x+y. Also, an application of the
form [λxA]D should be intuitively regarded as the function
λxA applied to the specific input D. Thus, if D represent
the number 7, then [λxA]D represents f(7). It follows from
elementary rules of algebra that this expression can be sim-
plified to 14+ y. Now, in our formalizations of lambda and
extensional theories, the role of conditions (β1), (β2), (β3),
(β4) and (β5) is in some sense algebraic: they serve to sim-
plify expressions like [λxA]D by performing some symbolic
manipulations. The remaining conditions, namely (αe) and
(ηe), have a different task; in this work, both of them are
seen as conditions of extensionality in the sense that they
allows us to infer that two terms (abstractions, in case of
(αe)) are the same (i.e., related by ∼) if they have the same
input–output behaviour, as we shall see in detail later on.
As promised, some comments on the set of variables V
are now in order.
Firstly, we make a rather trivial — but essential — re-
mark: we observe that the property of being infinite is cru-
cial. To see this, let us call a set of variables S cofinite if
its complement with respect to V is finite, in other words
if S = V \ F for some finite set of variables F . Now, the
reason for the infinity of V is that in order to develop even
the most elementary part of the lambda calculus we need
the following facts to hold:
• If S and T are cofinite, then so is S ∩ T ;
• if S is cofinite and S ⊆ T , then T is cofinite;
• every cofinite set is non–empty.
These properties immediately follow from the definition
of cofinite set and from the infinity of V. In the sequel,
in order to make the exposition less pedantic, we shall use
these simple properties without explicitly mentioning them.
Our choice is perfectly in line with what it is done the litera-
ture, wherewe often find statements like “let z be a variable
which occurs neither free in A nor bound in B” without the
explicit proof of the existence of this variable (which sim-
ply goes as follows: First, observe that the sets of variables
which occur free or bound in a term are finite, so that their
complements are cofinite. Then, the result follows, as the
intersection of cofinite sets is cofinite and cofinite sets can-
not be empty).
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Secondly, we note that it is fairly common in the lit-
erature of the lambda calculus to assume that the set of
variables is countably infinite, see for instance Hindley and
Seldin [26, Def. 1.1]. Of course, in order to make the above
properties of cofinite sets true, countable infinity suffices.
In this paper we do not need assume that the set of vari-
ables is countable and the reason is plain: we never invoke
that fact in our definitions and proofs.
Finally — and most importantly — we observe that it
is also common to assume that the set of variables comes
equipped with an ordering; again, see [26, Def. 1.1]. Here,
the motivation is ultimately related to the definition of sub-
stitution: if this notion is formalized as in [26], then at some
point of the definition we need to invoke the existence of a
choice function f from cofinite sets of variables to variables
such that f(S) ∈ S for every S. (Note that cofinite sets
must be non–empty for this discussion to make sense and
this is indeed the case!) We refer to Vestergaard [52] for
more on this aspect, where the axiom of cofinite choice is ex-
plicitly discussed. In passing, we also mention that choice
functions are specifically introduced by Stoughton [49] in
his approach to simultaneous substitution, see also Copello,
Szasz and Tasistro [15]. The crucial point of the present
discussion is this: if the set of variables is appropriately or-
dered, then a choice function f naturally arises. Indeed, for
each cofinite set S we can simply define f(S) as the first, in
the given order, variable which is a member of S (see also
Remark 7.1). In this paper we do not define substitution
as in [26]: in Section 7 we follow an elegant approach due
to Barendregt [4] which allows us to define substitution,
lambda theories and extensional theories without assum-
ing any ordering on variables. To sum up, in the present
work we do not need to impose any ordering on the set of
variables. Even more generally, we do not need to appeal
to the existence of some choice function either.
3 Prelambda Congruences
In this section, we introduce the notion of prelambda con-
gruence and discuss the conditions which define this con-
cept. Basic properties of prelambda congruences will be
studied in the next section.
Prelambda congruences are our first step towards our
formalizations of the concepts of lambda theory and exten-
sional theory. Even though it is technically incorrect, it may
be helpful to think of prelambda congruences as lambda
theories which do not necessarily satisfy the condition of
α–renaming — but, of course, they have to satisfy the β–
rule. (In a similar manner, preorders can be seen as partial
orders which do not necessarily satisfy anti–symmetry but
they do satisfy reflexivity and transitivity.) As a matter of
fact, we show that there exists a prelambda congruence ∼
with the following property: we have λxx 6∼ λyy for all vari-
ables x and y such that x 6= y. Since λxx ∼ λyy holds in ev-
ery lambda theory ∼, in order to develop our formalization
of lambda theory it is actually necessary to add α–renaming
at some stage.
Prelambda congruences which satisfy a suitable condi-
tion of α–renaming will be considered in Section 5 un-
der the name of lambda congruences. Similarly, in Sec-
tion 6 we shall introduce extensional congruences, which are
prelambda congruences which satisfy an appropriate con-
dition of η–extensionality.
There are essentially two motivations for introducing the
concept of prelambda congruence.
Firstly, the results that we prove in the next section on
the concept of independence of variables do not depend on
α–renaming and η–extensionality.
Secondly, the factorization of lambda and exten-
sional congruences respectively as “prelambda congruences
plus α–renaming” and “prelambda congruences plus η–
extensionality” will provides us with a mathematically rea-
sonable understanding of these two syntactical conditions
in terms of extensionality.
It is time for us to formally introduce prelambda congru-
ences.
Definition 3.1 (Prelambda congruence). Let ∼ be a con-
gruence. We say that ∼ is a prelambda congruence if it
also satisfies the following conditions:
(β1) [λxx]D ∼ D;
(β2) [λxy]D ∼ y, provided x 6= y;
(β3) [λx[AB]]D ∼ [[λxA]D][[λxB]D];
(β4) [λx[λxA]]D ∼ λxA;
(β5) [λyD]x ∼ D implies [λx[λyA]]D ∼ λy[[λxA]D],
provided x 6= y;
where A, B and D are arbitrary terms, and x and y are ar-
bitrary variables. We collectively refer to conditions (β1) to
(β5) above as beta conditions. △
Thus, in plain words a prelambda congruence is any bi-
nary relation on terms which simultaneously satisfies all
structural and beta conditions.
A simple example of prelambda congruence is the whole
set T2. A more interesting example is given in the following
definition.
Definition 3.2 (Prelambda conversion). We call
prelambda conversion the prelambda congruence
inductively defined by structural and beta conditions. △
In Corollary 3.4 below it is shown that T2 and prelambda
conversion are in fact different relations. Hence, if we re-
gard prelambda conversion as an equational theory where
equations are expressions of the form A ∼ B, then
prelambda conversion is consistent in the sense of Hilbert
and Post.
Let us now discuss the conditions of Definition 3.1 in
some detail.
With possibly some minor differences, conditions (β1),
(β2), (β3) and (β4) also appear in some work by Henkin
[25], Andrews [3], Révész [40, 41, 42], and Pigozzi and
Salibra [36, 37, 38]. For the sake of completeness, we also
mention that conditions (β1) and (β3) are also considered
by Andrews [2], but there conditions (β2) of (β4) are con-
densed into the following clause:
(γ1) [λxA]D ∼ A, provided x does not occur free in A.
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Among beta conditions, the more interesting one is cer-
tainly (β5). This condition constitutes a point of divergence
in the relevant literature. Actually, (β5) as formulated in
this paper seems to be new. Consider the following condi-
tions:
(γ2) [λx[λyA]]D ∼ λy[[λxA]D],
provided x 6= y and y does not occur free in D;
(γ3) [λx[λyA]]D ∼ λy[[λxA]D],
provided y is distinct from x and all variables occurring
in D;
(γ4) [λx[λyA]]D ∼ λy[[λxA]D],
provided x 6= y and at least one of these two conditions
hold: x does not occur free in A, y does not occur free
in D;
(γ5) [λyD]z ∼ D implies [λx[λyA]]D ∼ λy[[λxA]D],
provided x 6= y and y 6= z;
(γ6) [λx[λyA]][[λyD]z] ∼ λy[[λxA][[λyD]z]],
provided x 6= y and y 6= z.
Again, up to minor details, (γ2) is the version of (β5)
considered by Henkin [25, Axiom 7.5 p. 331] and Andrews
[2, 44 p. 3], (γ3) is another version considered by Andrews
[3, 44 p. 164] and finally (γ4) is the one taken into account
by Révész [42, β4 p. 29]. As we can see, all these conditions
explicitly mention some ancillary concept.
The condition which is most similar to our (β5) is the one
given by Pigozzi and Salibra in the context of lambda ab-
straction algebras (γ5) [37, β6 p. 12]; in fact, our condition
(β5) is actually a simplification of (γ5) — in the sense that
our condition requires two variables and one inequality to
be expressed, while (γ5) needs three variables and two in-
equalities. Our (γ6) is a shortened version of (γ5) due to
Pigozzi and Salibra [37, Prop. 1.5]. Conditions (γ5) and
(γ6) are equivalent in every lambda abstraction algebra. Fi-
nally, it is worth mentioning that Pigozzi and Salibra also
consider another “beta condition” in their setting, namely
[λxA]x ∼ A (see [37, β3 p. 12]). But for our purposes, we
do not need to consider this condition at all.
As we have just seen, (suitable versions of) beta condi-
tions have already been considered in the literature. They
perhaps seem a bit complicated at first, but a closer look
reveals that they are in fact quite natural and even easy to
memorize. To see this, notice that they are all of the form
[λxM]D ∼ G. Now, if we replace each term of the form
[λxM]D by an expression of the form JD/xK(M) and write=
instead of ∼ , then by a slight rearrangement we obtain
(βs1) JD/xK(x) = D;
(βs
2
) JD/xK(y) = y, if x 6= y;
(βs3) JD/xK(AB) = JD/xK(A)JD/xK(B);
(βs
4
) JD/xK(λxA) = λxA;
(βs
5
) JD/xK(λyA) = λyJD/xK(A),
if x 6= y (provided Jx/yK(D) = D).
Conditions (βs1), (β
s
2), (β
s
3), (β
s
4) and (β
s
5) above really
look like a kind of inductive definition of substitutionwhich
is not too dissimilar to the ones we can find in the litera-
ture (cf. Definition 7.2). In passing, it is worth observing
that these clauses are very similar to some of the condi-
tions which axiomatize lambda substitution algebras, alge-
braic structures introduced by Diskin and Beylin [21] with
the purposes of algebraizing the lambda calculus — in fact,
these algebras share several similarities with lambda ab-
straction algebras.
At this point, we hope that we have almost convinced
the reader that beta conditions are quite natural and in-
tuitive. However, if there is some reader which still feels
uncomfortable with the precondition [λyD]x ∼ D in condi-
tion (β5) (that is to say, the proviso Jx/yK(D) = D in (βs5)
above), then we would like to reassure the reader by saying
that the whole next section is dedicated to the study of the
“consequences” of [λyD]x ∼ D.
We now show that α–renaming is not available in every
prelambda congruence. For, let x and y be two distinct vari-
ables, and let∼ be an arbitrary prelambda congruence. If∼
were a lambda theory, we would certainly have λxx ∼ λyy
by using α–renaming. However, here nothing ensures that
we have λxx ∼ λyy. In fact, the following theorem shows
that any attempt of deriving λxx ∼ λyy by means of our
structural and beta conditions is doomed to failure.
Theorem 3.3. Let x and y be two variables such that x 6=
y. Then, there exists a prelambda congruence ∼I such that
λxx 6∼I λyy.
The proof of Theorem3.3 is quite long and technical. Fur-
thermore, in order to produce it we are forced to introduce
further notions andmethods that we do not need in the rest
of this paper. For these reasons, it is postponed to Section
9. Nevertheless, the interested reader can directly go there
without any hesitation, as no further material is needed to
read that part of this work.
As a consequence of the previous result, a very simple
proof of the fact that T2 and prelambda conversion are dis-
tinct relations is at our disposal.
Corollary 3.4. Let ∼ be prelambda conversion, and let x
and y be two distinct variables. Then, we have λxx 6∼ λyy. In
particular, ∼ is consistent.
Proof. Since∼ is the inductively defined prelambda congru-
ence, it is the intersection of all prelambda congruences. In
particular, we have ∼ ⊆∼I . From this and Theorem 3.3 it
follows that λxx 6∼ λyy. In particular, we have ∼ 6=T2.
4 Basic Properties of Prelambda
Congruences
In the previous section, we did not discussed the signifi-
cance of the precondition [λyD]x ∼ D in condition (β5).
In this section, we aim to fill this gap. Since this require-
ment turns out to be very important in our setting, it is
convenient to introduce some terminology to describe this
situation.
Definition 4.1 (Independence of variables). Let ∼ be a
prelambda congruence and let A be a term. We define the
set of variables ∼(A) as follows:
∼(A)
DEF
= {x | [λxA]z ∼ A for some variable z
such that x 6= z} .
Let x be a variable. We say that A is independent of x in
∼ if x ∈ ∼(A). △
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Thus, since in (β5) we have x 6= y, in the new terminol-
ogy the precondition [λyD]x ∼ D means that D is indepen-
dent of y in ∼ . There is a clear analogy with the proviso
“y does not occur free in D” of Henkin’s version of (β5) —
the condition we called (γ2) in the previous section. A pre-
cise relationship between independent variables and free
variables is given in Theorem 4.8.
The notion of independence of variables in the lambda
calculus has been introduced and studied by Pigozzi and
Salibra in the context of lambda abstraction algebras [36,
37, 38]. Even though prelambda congruences are not
lambda abstraction algebras, facts which look quite simi-
lar to “sharpened versions” of Proposition 4.2 and Lemma
4.3 below have been already established, see [37, Lem 1.6
and Prop. 1.7]. With a little effort, we could generalize
our facts in the same vein, but we find more instructive to
present them in the actual form because we do not need
anything more elaborated to prove our main results.
Technically speaking, the peculiar use of the concept of
independence of variables we make in this paper allows us
to avoid the introduction of the sets of all, free and bound
variables occurring in a term in the definitions of our no-
tions of prelambda, lambda and extensional congruences.
To begin the study of the concept of independence of vari-
ables in prelambda congruences, we show that a property
similar to the condition called (γ1) that we discussed in the
previous section also holds in our setting.
Proposition 4.2. Let ∼ be a prelambda congruence. Let x
be a variable and let A be a term. Suppose that x ∈ ∼(A).
Then, we have [λxA]D ∼ A for every term D.
Proof. Let D be a term. Since x ∈ ∼(A), there exists
a variable z such that x 6= z and [λxA]z ∼ A. Let
C
DEF
= [λx[[λxA]z]]D, E DEF= [λx[λxA]]D and F DEF= [λxz]D. Since
[λxA]z ∼ A, we obtain λx[[λxA]z] ∼ λxA by (ℓ). We have
D ∼ D by (r), and we get C ∼ [λxA]D by (a). Now,
by (β3) we deduce C ∼ EF and we have E ∼ λxA by
(β4). As x 6= z, we obtain F ∼ z by (β2) and it fol-
lows from (a) that EF ∼ [λxA]z. By using (s) we have
[λxA]D ∼ C ∼ EF ∼ [λxA]z ∼ A and we finally get
[λxA]D ∼ A from (t).
In regard to the syntactical category a term belongs to,
the following lemma gives a partial description of sets of
independent variables.
Lemma 4.3. Let ∼ be a prelambda congruence. Let x be
a variable, and let B and C be terms. Then, the following
statements hold:
(i) V \ {x} ⊆ ∼(x);
(ii) ∼(B) ∩ ∼(C) ⊆ ∼(BC);
(iii) ∼(B) ∪ {x} ⊆ ∼(λxB) (in particular, ∼(B) ⊆ ∼(λxB)).
Proof. (i) Let y ∈ V \ {x}. Since x 6= y, we have [λyx]x ∼ x
by (β2). Hence, we obtain y ∈ ∼(x).
(ii) Let y ∈ ∼(B) ∩∼(C) and let z be a variable such that
y 6= z. By Proposition 4.2 it follows that [λyB]z ∼ B and
[λyC]z ∼ C, and we obtain [[λyB]z][[λyC]z] ∼ BC by (a).
From (β3), we have [λy[BC]]z ∼ [[λyB]z][[λyC]z] and we
get [λy[BC]]z ∼ BC from (t). Therefore, we conclude that
y ∈ ∼(BC).
(iii) Let z be a variable such that x 6= z. Then, we have
[λx[λxB]]z ∼ λxB by (β4) and hence it follows that x ∈
∼(λxA). Now, let y ∈ ∼(B) \ {x} and let z be a variable
such that x 6= z and y 6= z. By Proposition 4.2, we get
[λyB]z ∼ B. Since x 6= y and x 6= z, we have [λxz]y ∼ z
by (β2) and hence [λy[λxB]]z ∼ λx[[λyB]z] by (β5). Since
[λyB]z ∼ B, we also have λx[[λyB]z] ∼ λxB from (ℓ).
Finally, we obtain [λy[λxB]]z ∼ λxB from (t). As y 6= z, we
conclude that y ∈ ∼(λxB).
Our next step is to relate the notion of independence of
variables in prelambda congruences to the usual concept
of free variable. Up to now, we dealt with them informally
and appealed to the reader’s previous knowledge of this
concept. Since at this point we need to prove some formal
facts about free variables, we now recall the formal defi-
nition. Nevertheless, for the sake of better readability, in
informal discussions below we shall often express the con-
cept of free variable in words, rather than employing the
symbolism of Definition 4.4.
As already noticed by Welch [55, Rem. 0.3.4], for the de-
velopment of the lambda calculus it is actually more clear
and convenient to formalize the concept of variable which
does not occur free in a given term. Here, we follow the
same idea because this approach makes the connection be-
tween non–free and independent variables tighter. Non–
free variables are sometimes called fresh variables in the
literature, for instance in Copello, Szasz and Tasistro [15].
Definition 4.4 (Non–free variable). Let A be a term. We
define the cofinite set of variables F(A) by induction on the
structure of A as follows:
• F(x) DEF= V \ {x};
• F(BC) DEF= F(B) ∩ F(C);
• F(λxB) DEF= F(B) ∪ {x}.
Finally, we say that a variable x does not occur free in A
if x ∈ F(A). △
The next theorem is fundamental for the main results of
this paper.
Theorem 4.5. Let ∼ be a prelambda congruence and let A
be a term. Then, we have F(A) ⊆ ∼(A).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of A.
Suppose that A = x. By Lemma 4.3(i), we have F(x) =
V \ {x} ⊆ ∼(x).
Suppose that A = BC. By inductive hypothesis, we have
F(B) ⊆ ∼(B) and F(C) ⊆ ∼(C). Thus, we obtain F(BC) =
F(B) ∩ F(C) ⊆ ∼(B) ∩ ∼(C) ⊆ ∼(BC) by using Lemma
4.3(ii).
Finally, suppose that A = λxB. By inductive hypothesis,
we have F(B) ⊆ ∼(B). By Lemma 4.3(iii), it follows that
F(λxB) = F(B) ∪ {x} ⊆ ∼(B) ∪ {x} ⊆ ∼(λxB).
An immediate consequence of Theorem 4.5 is that in ev-
ery prelambda congruence ∼ all sets of variables of the
form ∼(A) are cofinite. A more remarkable consequence
is that condition (γ2), discussed in the previous section, al-
ways holds in our setting as we show in the second part of
the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.6. Let ∼ be a prelambda congruence. Let A
and D be terms. Let x and y be variables such that x 6= y.
Then, the following statements hold:
(i) Suppose that y ∈ ∼(D). Then, we have [λx[λyA]]D ∼
λy[[λxA]D].
(ii) Suppose that y ∈ F(D). Then, we have [λx[λyA]]D ∼
λy[[λxA]D].
Proof. (i) We have [λyD]x ∼ D by Proposition 4.2. As x 6= y,
we obtain [λx[λyA]]D ∼ λy[[λxA]D] by (β5).
(ii) It follows from (i) above, as we have y ∈ ∼(D) by
Theorem 4.5.
We now further analyze the relationship between inde-
pendent and non–free variables, though the facts we are
now going to establish are not strictly needed to prove our
main results. To begin with, we show that independence
and non–freedom are not equivalent notions. In the fol-
lowing example we show that the converse of Theorem 4.5
does not hold.
Example 4.7. Let us consider the case ∼ =T2. Since all
terms are related, we have ∼(A) = V for every term A.
However, it is not true that F(A) = V for every term A; for
instance, we have F(x) = V \ {x} for every variable x. △
The previous example does not exclude the existence of
a prelambda congruence ∼ in which it is possible to have
∼(A) = F(A) for every term A. However, we can show that
such a ∼ cannot exist. Actually, we prove an even stronger
version of this fact in Corollary 4.9 below, which is a conse-
quence of the theorem that we now show.
Theorem 4.8 (Independence and non–free variables). Let
∼ be a prelambda congruence and let A be a term. We have
∼(A) = {v | v ∈ F(B) for some term B
such that B ∼ A} .
Proof. Let S DEF= {v | v ∈ F(B) for some term B such that
B ∼ A} and let x be a variable.
Suppose that x ∈ ∼(A). Then, there exists a variable z
such that x 6= z and [λxA]z ∼ A. Let B DEF= [λxA]z. Since
x 6= z, we have x ∈ ( F(A) ∪ {x}) ∩ (V \ {z}) = F(B). As
B ∼ A, we conclude that x ∈ S.
Suppose now that x ∈ S. Let B be a term such that x ∈
F(B) and B ∼ A. Since x ∈ F(B), we have x ∈ ∼(B) by
Theorem 4.5. In particular, there exists a variable z such
that x 6= z and [λxB]z ∼ B. Now, since B ∼ A, we have
λxB ∼ λxA by (ℓ). From (r) it follows that z ∼ z. So,
we obtain [λxB]z ∼ [λxA]z by (a). By using (s), we have
[λxA]z ∼ [λxB]z ∼ B ∼ A and we obtain [λxA]z ∼ A from
(t). As x 6= z, we conclude that x ∈ ∼(A).
Corollary 4.9. There exists a term A such that in every
prelambda congruence ∼ we have ∼(A) * F(A).
Proof. Let x and y be variables such that x 6= y, and let
A
DEF
= [λxy]x. Let ∼ be a prelambda congruence. Since
F(A) = F(λxy)∩ F(x) = F(λxy)∩
(
V\{x}
)
, we have x /∈ F(A).
Since x 6= y, we have A ∼ y from (β2) and y ∼ A from
(s). Also, we have x ∈ V \ {y} = F(y) and so it follows that
x ∈ F(B) for some term B such that B ∼ A. Thus, we obtain
x ∈ ∼(A) by means of Theorem 4.8.
Now, if ∼(A) ⊆ F(A) were true, then we would get x ∈
F(A) but this would contradict x /∈ F(A). Therefore, we
have ∼(A) * F(A).
5 Lambda Congruences
We now turn our attention to the intuitive interpretation of
terms as functions in prelambda congruences. Let ∼ be an
arbitrary prelambda congruence.
In Section 2 we observed that a term of the form λxA
should be thought as a function whose domain is the whole
set of terms T (including λxA itself). Under this perspec-
tive, when the function λxA is applied to an input D, any
term B such that B ∼ [λxA]D should be thought as the
output of λxA on input D. This view is justified by the fact
that the terms B and [λxA]D are meant to be same in ∼
when B ∼ [λxA]D holds, so that syntactically different
terms related to [λxA]D are just different representations
of the same output. Depending on the practical aims, bet-
ter and more informative representations of the output can
be computed using structural and beta conditions. Clearly,
different prelambda congruences can produce different out-
comes; for instance, if ∼ =T2 then any term is the output
of any function on any input.
Notice that we do not require that every term has to be
thought as a function. So, variables and applications can
be simply thought as constituents for forming functions —
of course, they can be inputs and outputs of functions. (In
a similar fashion, in set theory with urelements it is not re-
quired urelements to be sets, but they can be used to build
sets.) In Section 6 the possibility of regarding every term
as a function will be investigated.
So far so good. However, if we seriously want to develop
a reasonable theory of functions inside the lambda calculus
we should expect the following property of extensionality
for functions to be true: two functions should be considered
as the same if they have identical input–output behaviour.
This property clearly holds in set theory: given a set Z and
two functions f and g from Z to itself we always have
f(d) = g(d) for every d ∈ Z implies f = g .
Thus, if we want to think abstractions as functions then we
should expect the following property of extensionality for
abstractions to hold:
[λxA]D ∼ [λyB]D for every term D implies λxA ∼ λyB .
Quite suggestively, we observe that our formulation of ex-
tensionality for abstractions strikingly resembles the axiom
of extensionality of von Neumann’s set theory based on func-
tions [53, p. 397 and Axiom I4 p. 399].
A serious problem of prelambda congruences is that it
is not always the case that extensionality for abstractions
holds. For instance, if ∼ is prelambda conversion (see Defi-
nition 3.2), then for distinct variables x and y and any term
D we have [λxx]D ∼ D and [λyy]D ∼ D by (β1). So, by
using (s) we obtain [λxx]D ∼ D ∼ [λyy]D and by (t) we
get [λxx]D ∼ [λyy]D which shows that the two abstractions
λxx and λyy have the same input–output behaviour. But
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λxx ∼ λyy does not hold, by Corollary 3.4. Hence, in the
section we focus our attention on prelambda congruences
which satisfy extensionality of abstraction.
Nevertheless, we do not regard prelambda congruences
that do not satisfy such a form of extensionality — such as
prelambda conversion — as uninteresting. We strongly be-
lieve that these congruences may serve as a foundation for
the development of a truly intensional (as opposed to ex-
tensional) theory of algorithms . . . but this is another story.
Another intriguing motivation for considering extension-
ality for abstractions is the fact that this condition has been
present in the lambda calculus from the very beginning —
though under a completely different guise. In fact, in ev-
ery prelambda congruence extensionality for abstractions
and α–renaming are equivalent conditions, as we show in
Theorem 5.5.
We believe that the usual informal explanations of α–
renaming, as “the names of bound variables are immate-
rial” and the like, provide neither a good justification of
what is really going on nor a good motivation for accepting
this condition as natural. Moreover, in the literature we are
not aware of any line of work which attempts to clarify the
real significance of this condition. In this paper, we can give
a mathematically significant answer: α–renaming is just a
compact reformulation of the property of extensionality for
abstractions.
We now formally introduce the concept of lambda congru-
ence: prelambda congruences which satisfy our condition
of α–renaming (αe).
Definition 5.1 (Lambda congruence ). Let ∼ be a pre-
lambda congruence. We say that ∼ is a lambda congru-
ence if it also satisfies the following condition:
(αe) [λyA]x ∼ A implies λxA ∼ λy[[λxA]y];
where x and y are arbitrary variables and A is an arbitrary
term. △
In other words, a lambda congruence is any binary rela-
tion on terms which simultaneously satisfies all structural
and beta conditions together with condition (αe). In par-
ticular, every lambda congruence is also a prelambda con-
gruence and so the general results on independence of vari-
ables we proved in the previous section can be applied to
lambda congruences as well.
Since our formulation of α–renaming as (αe) seems to
be new, we now discuss our condition in relation to other
clauses of α–renaming proposed in the relevant literature,
as we did in Section 3 for (β5). Other conditions of α–
renaming which are perhaps more standard are considered
by Crole [17, Sec. 3]; however, they do not fit the aims
of the present work because their formulations require ei-
ther substitution or new operations such as atom swapping.
Consider the following conditions:
(δ1) λxA ∼ λy[[λxA]y], provided y does not occur free in A;
(δ2) [λyA]z ∼ A implies λxA ∼ λy[[λxA]y], provided y 6= z;
(δ3) λx[[λyA]z] ∼ λy[[λx[[λyA]z]]y], provided y 6= z.
Up to minor differences, (δ1) is the condition of α–
renaming considered by Révész [42, α p. 29], while con-
ditions (δ2) and (δ3) have been introduced by Pigozzi and
Salibra in the theory of lambda abstraction algebras [37, α
p. 12 and Prop. 1.5]. In their setting, (δ2) and (δ3) are
equivalent. Our condition (αe) is actually a simplified ver-
sion of (δ2) inasmuch as (αe) requires two variables to be
expressed, while (δ2) three variables and one inequality.
In the type theories developed by Henkin [25] and An-
drews [2, 3], the situation is rather different; in their set-
ting it is present a condition which is similar to our exten-
sionality for abstractions. Roughly speaking, they consider
a condition of extensionality for terms which have the same
“arrow type”; this condition in turn implies α–renaming for
some classes of terms, see for instance [25, Axiom Schema
6 p. 330 and Thm. 7.21]. A crucial difference is that
their condition of extensionality can be simply expressed
as a term of their language. By contrast, in our setting ex-
tensionality for abstractions is a first–order sentence of the
meta–language.
Regarding our formulation of α–renaming we also ob-
serve the following fact.
Remark 5.2. Let ∼ be a prelambda congruence. Let A be
a term and let x be a variable. Suppose that [λxA]x ∼ A.
Then, from (ℓ) we have λx[[λxA]x] ∼ λxA and from (s) we
obtain λxA ∼ λx[[λxA]x]. This show that condition (αe) is
already present in any prelambda congruence in the special
case x = y. Therefore, the real content of (αe) is actually
(δ4) [λyA]x ∼ A implies λxA ∼ λy[[λxA]y], provided x 6= y.
However, we prefer to express our condition of α–renaming
by means of (αe) rather than (δ4) because the former ad-
mits a shorter formulation. △
In order to improve its intuitive understanding, we may
rewrite, in the notation employed in Section 3, condition
(αe) in the following form:
(αse) λxA = λyJy/xK(A) (provided Jx/yK(A) = A).
In this shape, it appears to be very similar to the usual con-
ditions of α–renaming which one finds in the literature.
Contrarily to our treatment of prelambda congruences,
it is not worth giving examples of specific lambda congru-
ences. The reason is that in Section 8 we shall show that
lambda congruences and lambda theories are actually the
same concept, and in the literature of the lambda calculus
examples of lambda theories abound. But it is worth giv-
ing an example of a prelambda congruence which is not a
lambda congruence.
Proposition 5.3. Let ∼ be a lambda congruence. Let x and
y be two variables such that x 6= y. Then, we have λxx ∼
λyy. In particular, prelambda conversion is not a lambda
congruence.
Proof. We have [λyx]x ∼ x by (β2). Thus, we obtain λxx ∼
λy[[λxx]y] by (αe). By (β1) it follows that [λxx]y ∼ y and
thus we get λy[[λxx]y] ∼ λyy from (ℓ). Hence, we obtain
λxx ∼ λyy by (t). In particular, by Corollary 3.4 prelambda
conversion cannot be a lambda congruence.
We now show, in the second part of the following propo-
sition, that condition (δ1) above holds in every lambda con-
gruence.
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Proposition 5.4. Let ∼ be a lambda congruence. Let A
be a term, and let x and y be variables. Then, the following
statements hold:
(i) Suppose that y ∈ ∼(A). Then, we have λxA ∼
λy[[λxA]y].
(ii) Suppose that y ∈ F(A). Then, we have λxA ∼
λy[[λxA]y].
Proof. (i) We have [λyA]x ∼ A by Proposition 4.2 and we
obtain λxA ∼ λy[[λxA]y] from (αe).
(ii) It follows from (i) above, as we have y ∈ ∼(A) by
Theorem 4.5.
Our next step is to show that in every prelambda congru-
ence conditions (αe) and extensionality for abstractions are
equivalent.
Theorem 5.5. Let ∼ be a prelambda congruence. Then, ∼
is a lambda congruence if and only if it satisfies the condition
of extensionality for abstractions:
(ea) [λxA]D ∼ [λyB]D for every termD implies λxA ∼ λyB,
for all terms A and B, and all variables x and y.
Proof. Suppose that ∼ is a lambda congruence. Let A and
B be terms, and let x and y be variables. Let E DEF= λxA and
F
DEF
= λyB. Assume ED ∼ FD for every term D. We now
show that E ∼ F. Let z ∈ ∼(A) ∩ ∼(B). Then, we have
Ez ∼ Fz and we get λz[Ez] ∼ λz[Fz] from (ℓ). As z ∈ ∼(A)
and z ∈ ∼(B) we obtain E ∼ λz[Ez] and F ∼ λz[Fz] by
Proposition 5.4(i). By using (s), we have E ∼ λz[Ez] ∼
λz[Fz] ∼ F. By (t), we obtain E ∼ F.
Suppose now that ∼ is a prelambda congruence which
satisfies (ea). Let A be a term, and let x and y be variables.
Let E DEF= λxA and F DEF= λy[Ey]. Assume [λyA]x ∼ A. We now
prove that E ∼ F. If x = y, then we can derive E ∼ F as in
Remark 5.2. If x 6= y, then let z ∈ ∼(E) ∩ ∼(F) ∩ (V \ {x}).
LetM DEF= [λyE]z and N DEF= [λyy]z. We have Fz ∼ MN by (β3).
As x 6= z, it follows that [λxz]y ∼ z by (β2). Hence, we get
M ∼ λx[[λyA]z] by (β5). Since x 6= y, we have y ∈∼(A)
from the assumption [λyA]x ∼ A. Hence, by Proposition
4.2 we obtain [λyA]z ∼ A and we get λx[[λyA]z] ∼ E from
(ℓ). Thus, we haveM ∼ E from (t). Now, by (β1) we obtain
N ∼ z and we get MN ∼ Ez from (a). By (t), we obtain
Fz ∼ Ez and so λz[Ez] ∼ λz[Fz] from (s) and (ℓ). Let D
be an arbitrary term. From (r) we have D ∼ D and by (a)
we obtain [λz[Ez]]D ∼ [λz[Fz]]D. Let G ∈ {E,F}. We have
[λz[Gz]]D ∼ [[λzG]D]][[λzz]D] by (β3). Since z ∈ ∼(G), we
have [λzG]D ∼ G by Proposition 4.2. By (β1) we obtain
[λzz]D ∼ D. Thus, by (a) it follows that [[λzG]D]][[λzz]D] ∼
GD and by (t) we obtain [λz[Gz]]D ∼ GD. This shows that
we have [λz[Ez]]D ∼ ED and [λz[Fz]]D ∼ FD. By using (s)
we obtain ED ∼ [λz[Ez]]D ∼ [λz[Fz]]D ∼ FD and ED ∼ FD
from (t). Since the term D is arbitrary, we have ED ∼ FD
for every term D. As E and F are both abstractions, we
obtain E ∼ F by using (ea).
Thus, by the previous theorem our formulation of α–
renaming (αe) and extensionality for abstractions (ea) are
equivalent. This equivalence is significant precisely be-
cause, by Proposition 5.3, (αe) does not hold in every
prelambda congruence. We decided to axiomatize lambda
congruences using (αe) because this condition is more com-
pact and also because this approach is more akin to tra-
ditional presentations of lambda theories. But for us, the
actual meaning of α–renaming is precisely the property of
extensionality for abstractions.
6 Extensional Congruences
In the previous section, we followed the idea that only ab-
stractions should be thought as functions. In section we
expand our vision and explore the possibility of thinking
every term as a function.
In order to implement this idea, the most natural way
is to consider lambda congruences ∼ where each term
is related to an abstraction. The typical condition of η–
extensionality — that we shall discuss in the next section
—
A ∼ λy[Ay] , provided y does not occur free in A
clearly does the required job. In our setting, to achieve the
same result without introducing any ancillary concept, it
suffices to consider prelambda congruences which satisfy a
simpler condition of η–extensionality, our condition (ηe).
This lead us to the formalization of the concept of exten-
sional congruence.
Definition 6.1 (Extensional congruence). Let ∼ be a
prelambda congruence. We say that ∼ is an extensional
congruence if ∼ also satisfies the following condition:
(ηe) y ∼ λx[yx], provided x 6= y;
where x and y are arbitrary variables. △
Thus, an extensional congruence is any binary rela-
tion on terms which simultaneously satisfies all structural
and beta conditions together with our condition of η–
extensionality (ηe). Of course, since every extensional con-
gruence is also a prelambda congruence, the general facts
on independence of variables we observed in Section 4 can
be applied to extensional congruences as well.
Regarding our formalization, our exact formulation of
condition (ηe) seems to be new, even though we recognize
a strong similarity with a condition introduced by Hindley
and Longo for studying models of the lambda calculus [27,
Eq. 7 Lem. 4.2]. Their condition is, essentially, one in-
stance of our condition (ηe). The main difference is that in
their setting α–renaming is available; so it is possible to use
α–renaming to generate more instances. On the contrary,
here we are working with arbitrary prelambda congruences
and we are somehow forced to consider every combination
of variables in our (ηe). But the actual power of (ηe) is
quite remarkable: it allows us to derive our condition of
α–renaming (αe) in every extensional congruence, as we
show in Theorem 6.3.
We now survey some conditions of η–extensionality con-
sidered in the literature which do not mention any ancillary
concept:
(ǫ1) λx[[[λxA]y]x] ∼ [λxA]y, provided x 6= y;
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(ǫ2) y ∼ λxA for some term A, provided x 6= y;
(ǫ3) i ∼ 1.
Up to inessential differences, conditions (ǫ1) and (ǫ2) are
due to Salibra; the former is specifically employed in the ax-
iomatization of the concept of extensional lambda abstrac-
tion algebra, while the latter is provably equivalent to (ǫ1)
[44, Def. 57 and Prop. 58]. Our condition (ηe) clearly
resembles (ǫ2).
Condition (ǫ3) is often employed in model theoretical
studies of the lambda calculus, again see [27, Lem. 4.2]
and [44, Prop. 58]. Here i and 1 respectively denote the
terms λyy and λy[λx[yx]] for x 6= y. Again, (ǫ3) is specif-
ically designed to work in settings where α–renaming is
available.
As already said, in Theorem 6.3 we show that every ex-
tensional congruence is a lambda congruence. Thus, there
is no reason to explicitly include condition (αe) in the ax-
iomatization. The property that α–renaming can be de-
rived from η–extensionality is not so well–known but it has
been already noticed for the simply typed lambda calculus
by Došen and Petrić [22, Sec. 3]. Indeed, we have taken
account of their idea in our formalization of extensional
congruence.
Since in Section 8 we shall show that extensional con-
gruences precisely correspond to extensional theories, in
the present section we do not give concrete examples of
extensional congruences; rather, we concentrate on estab-
lishing the technical facts we need to show the aforemen-
tioned equivalence and on explaining the real significance
of η–extensionality in our setting.
The first result we present is given in the second part
of following proposition, where we show that the tradi-
tional formulation of η–extensionality holds every exten-
sional congruence.
Proposition 6.2. Let ∼ be an extensional congruence. Let A
be a term and let y be a variable. Then, the following state-
ments hold:
(i) Suppose that y ∈ ∼(A). Then, we have A ∼ λy[Ay].
(ii) Suppose that y ∈ F(A). Then, we have A ∼ λy[Ay].
Proof. (i) Let x be a variable such that x 6= y. Let B DEF=
[[λxx]A][[λxy]A], C DEF= [λx[xy]]A and D DEF= λx[λy[xy]]. From
(β3), we have C ∼ B. From (β1) and (β2) we obtain
[λxx]A ∼ A and [λxy]A ∼ y, and it follows from (a)
that B ∼ Ay. By (t) we have C ∼ Ay, and so we obtain
λyC ∼ λy[Ay] from (ℓ). Now, as x 6= y, we have x ∼ λy[xy]
from (ηe) and λxx ∼ D from (ℓ). By (r), we get A ∼ A. So,
by (a) we have [λxx]A ∼ DA. Since x 6= y and y ∈ ∼(A),
we obtain DA ∼ λyC by Proposition 4.6(i). By using (s),
we have A ∼ [λxx]A ∼ DA ∼ λyC ∼ λy[Ay], and we get
A ∼ λy[Ay] from (t).
(ii) It follows from (i) above, as we have y ∈ ∼(A) by
Theorem 4.5.
In order to achieve all the goals we set in the beginning
of this section, it only remains to prove that (αe) holds in
every extensional congruence.
Theorem6.3. Every extensional congruence is a lambda con-
gruence.
Proof. Let∼ be an extensional congruence. LetA be a term,
and let x and y be variables. Let B DEF= λxA. We have to show
that [λyA]x ∼ A implies B ∼ λy[By]. Assume [λyA]x ∼ A. If
x = y, then we proceed as in Remark 5.2. If x 6= y, then we
have y ∈ ∼(A) and we obtain y ∈ ∼(B) by Lemma 4.3(iii).
By Proposition 6.2(i) we obtain B ∼ λy[By].
In the following corollary we show that the set of all ex-
tensional congruences is properly included in the set of all
prelambda congruences.
Corollary 6.4. There exists a prelambda congruence which
is not an extensional congruence.
Proof. By Proposition 5.3, prelambda conversion is not a
lambda congruence and hence it cannot be an extensional
congruence by Proposition 6.3.
Regarding the real significance of η–extensionality in our
settingwe now consider the following condition that we call
extensionality for terms:
AD ∼ BD for every term D implies A ∼ B .
This form of extensionality has been considered by many
authors: for instance, in combinatory logic by Rosenbloom
[43, p. 112] and in the lambda calculus by Wadsworth
[54, p. 493], Hindley and Longo [27, p. 297] and Hind-
ley and Seldin [26, p. 77]. While each condition of η–
extensionality so far considered has a strong syntactical
and artificial flavour and no apparent connection with any
property of extensionality, the property of extensionality
for terms above has a clear mathematical significance: two
terms should be regarded as the same if they have the
same input–output behaviour. We now prove that in every
prelambda congruence extensionality for terms is equiva-
lent to (ηe).
Theorem 6.5. Let ∼ be a prelambda congruence. Then,
∼ is an extensional congruence if and only if it satisfies the
condition of extensionality for terms:
(et) AD ∼ BD for every term D implies A ∼ B,
for all terms A and B.
Proof. Suppose that ∼ is an extensional congruence. We
now show that ∼ satisfies (et). For, we assume AD ∼ BD
for every term D and prove that A ∼ B.
Let z ∈ ∼(A)∩∼(B). We have Az ∼ Bz and we get λz[Az] ∼
λz[Bz] by (ℓ). By Proposition 6.2(i), we get A ∼ λz[Az] and
B ∼ λz[Bz]. By using (s) we have A ∼ λz[Az] ∼ λz[Bz] ∼ B
and we get A ∼ B from (t).
Suppose now that ∼ is a prelambda congruence which
satisfies (et). Let x and y be two variables such that x 6= y.
We now prove that y ∼ λx[yx]. Let D be an arbitrary term.
We have [λx[yx]]D ∼ [[λxy]D][[λxx]D] by (β3). By (β2) and
(β1) we get [λxy]D ∼ y and [λxx]D ∼ D. So, we obtain
[[λxy]D][[λxx]D] ∼ yD by (a). By using (s) we have yD ∼
[[λxy]D][[λxx]D] ∼ [λx[yx]]D and by using (t) we obtain
yD ∼ [λx[yx]]D. This shows that we have yD ∼ [λx[yx]]D
for every term D. Hence, we can apply (et) to obtain y ∼
λx[yx].
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Again, observe that this equivalence is significant be-
cause, by Corollary 6.4, (ηe) does not hold in every
prelambda congruence.
We can now give a proper conclusion to our informal dis-
cussion of terms as functions. Recall that for us a class
of terms intended to play the role of functions must sat-
isfy the condition of extensionality discussed in the Sec-
tion 5, where we examined the case of abstractions as func-
tions. By Theorem 6.5, in every extensional congruence
we can think every term as a function and consider the
condition (ηe) as a compact and equivalent way to express
the property of extensionality for terms — this also gives a
proper justification for the terminology “η–extensionality”
employed for our condition (ηe).
7 Lambda and Extensional Theories
Our next step is to prove that lambda and extensional con-
gruences precisely correspond to lambda and extensional
theories, respectively. In this section, we recall the tradi-
tional definitions of these theories and prove some prelimi-
nary properties that we need to prove our results.
Our definitions of lambda and extensional theories are
perfectly in line with the ones which can be found in the
literature; see, e.g., Meyer [33, p. 92].
In order to provide the axiomatizations, we need to for-
malize the notion of substitution first. To this aim, we point
out that there exist several different definitions of substitu-
tion in the literature. A typical approach is to proceed as in
the following remark.
Remark 7.1. The definition of substitution which is often
found in the literature is the one given by Hindley and
Seldin [26, Def. 1.12]. It is actually a variation of the one
proposed by Curry and Feys [19, p. 94] and it is commonly
called capture–free substitution.
We now recall its definition in order to discuss and em-
phasize some of its aspects. Expressed in our notation, it
can be formulated as follows:
(1) {D/x}(x) DEF= D;
(2) {D/x}(y) DEF= y, if x 6= y;
(3) {D/x}(AB) DEF= {D/x}(A){D/x}(B);
(4) {D/x}(λxA) DEF= λxA;
(5) {D/x}(λyA) DEF= λyA,
if x 6= y and x does not occur free in A;
(6) {D/x}(λyA) DEF= λy{D/x}(A),
if x 6= y, x occurs free in A and y does not occur free in
D;
(7) {D/x}(λyA) DEF= λz{D/x}({z/y}(A)),
if x 6= y, x occurs free in A and y occurs free in D,
where z is the first variable in which does not occur
free in both A and D.
Despite its complicated axiomatization, substitution as
defined above has the following pleasant property: the
usual β–rule of the lambda calculus can be simply ex-
pressed as [λxA]D ∼ {D/x}(A), without any restriction.
However, there are also some disadvantages in considering
the above formalization.
Firstly, the definition above is not given by induction on
the structure of terms. The reason is that in condition (7)
above there is {z/y}(A) and not A in the right hand side
λz{D/x}({z/y}(A)) of DEF=. In fact, the previous definition is
by induction on the size of terms. So, in order to define
substitution in this way, we need first a definition of the
concept of size of a term. Furthermore, we need to prove
that the previous construction is well–defined and to do so,
it is also necessary to prove that {z/y}(A) and A have the
same size.
Secondly, in condition (7) above, it is assumed that the
set of variables is equipped with an appropriate ordering.
As already said in Section 2, we do not want to assume this
inasmuch as there are other ways to define substitution. △
In this article, we follow the simpler and more elegant
approach to substitution developed by Barendregt in his
dissertation [4]. (It should not be confused with the more
familiar one developed by Barendregt in his classic book
[5].)
Definition 7.2 (Substitution). Let A and D be terms, and
let x be a variable. By induction on the structure of A, we
define the term 〈D/x〉(A) as follows:
(S1) 〈D/x〉(x)
DEF
= D;
(S2) 〈D/x〉(y)
DEF
= y, if x 6= y;
(S3) 〈D/x〉(BC)
DEF
= 〈D/x〉(B)〈D/x〉(C);
(S4) 〈D/x〉(λxB)
DEF
= λxB;
(S5) 〈D/x〉(λyB)
DEF
= λy〈D/x〉(B), if x 6= y.
We call the term 〈D/x〉(A) the result of the substitution
of x for D in A. △
In order to define the concepts of lambda and extensional
theory we now formally define the notion of variable occur-
ring bound in a term. However, for the sake of conformity
with our formal treatment of free variables, we prefer to
define the set of variables which do not occur bound in a
given term instead.
Definition 7.3 (Non–bound variable). Let A be a term. We
define the cofinite set of variables B(A) by induction on the
structure of A as follows:
• B(x) DEF= V;
• B(BC) DEF= B(B) ∩ B(C);
• B(λxB) DEF= B(B) \ {x}.
We also say that a variable x does not occur bound in A if
x ∈ B(A). △
Having now properly defined the necessary ancillary con-
cepts, we are finally ready to define the notions of lambda
and extensional theory.
Definition 7.4 (Lambda and extensional theory). Let ∼ be
a congruence. We say that ∼ is a lambda theory if it also
satisfies the following conditions:
(β) [λxA]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(A), provided B(A) ∪ F(D) = V;
(α) λxA ∼ λy〈y/x〉(A), provided y ∈ F(A) ∩ B(A);
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whereA andD are arbitrary terms, and x and y are arbitrary
variables.
Let ∼ be a lambda theory. We say that ∼ is an exten-
sional theory if it also satisfies the following condition:
(η) A ∼ λy[Ay], provided y ∈ F(A);
where A is an arbitrary term and y is an arbitrary variable.
△
Thus, a lambda theory is any binary relation on terms
which simultaneously satisfies all structural conditions and
conditions (β) and (α) given above. If, in addition, the rela-
tion is also closed under (η), then it is an extensional theory.
The most important examples of lambda and extensional
theories are lambda conversion and extensional conversion.
Definition 7.5 (Lambda and extensional conversion). We
call lambda conversion the lambda theory inductively de-
fined by structural conditions, (β) and (α). We also de-
fine extensional conversion as the extensional theory in-
ductively defined by structural conditions, (β), (α) and (η).
△
Let us now discuss the conditions of Definition 7.4 in
some detail.
Conditions (β) and (α) are as in Barendregt [4, p. 4].
Note that (β) presents a restriction on its applicability,
namely B(A) ∪ F(D) = V. In the original formulation, this
restriction is equivalently expressed follows: bound vari-
ables of A and free variables of D are disjoint sets. In this
paper, instead of putting complications directly inside the
definition of substitution (cf. the capture–free substitution
of Remark 7.1), we prefer to have a simple notion of substi-
tution at the price of this restriction. In the next example
we can see how the proviso B(A) ∪ F(D) = V works.
Example 7.6. Let∼ be a lambda theory. Let x and y be vari-
ables such that x 6= y. We have 〈y/x〉(λyx) = λy〈y/x〉(x) =
λyy. However, we cannot infer [λx[λyx]]y ∼ λyy directly
from (β), as we have B(λyx) ∪ F(y) =
(
B(x) \ {y}
)
∪
(
V \
{y}
)
=
(
V \ {y}
)
∪
(
V \ {y}
)
= V \ {y} 6= V. △
As for (α), when compared with other formalizations of
α–renaming that one usually finds in the literature, the
main difference lies in the restriction y ∈ F(A)∩ B(A) which
is not just the “usual” proviso y ∈ F(A) (that is, y does not
occur free in A). The next example explains the situation.
Example 7.7. Let∼ be a lambda theory. Let x and y be vari-
ables such that x 6= y. As before, we have 〈y/x〉(λyx) = λyy.
From this, it follows that λy〈y/x〉(λyx) = λy[λyy]. Since
x 6= y, we have y ∈ V \ {x} = (V \ {x}) ∪ {y} = F(λyx).
However, we cannot infer λx[λyx] ∼ λy[λyy] directly from
(α), as we have y /∈ V \ {y} = B(x) \ {y} = B(λyx) and in
particular y /∈ F(λyx) ∩ B(λyx).
Notice that if we use the capture–free substitution of Re-
mark 7.1, then, in order to calculate {y/x}(λyx), we are
forced to use condition (7) as we have x 6= y, x /∈ F(λyx)
and y /∈ F(y). In this case, we obtain {y/x}(λyx) =
λz{y/x}({z/y}x)) = λz{y/x}(x) = λzy where z is the first
variable in V\{x, y} = F(x)∩ F(y). From this, it follows that
λy{y/x}(λyx) = λy[λzx] and we can infer λx[λyx] ∼ λy[λzy]
by using (α) with the “usual” restriction y ∈ F(A). △
Finally, we note that condition (η) is exactly as in the
literature.
As already pointed out, Došen and Petrić [22] observed
that it is not necessary to include α–renaming in the axiom-
atization extensional theories. Indeed, we followed their
idea in our formalization of extensional congruences. How-
ever, we do not take their observation into account in the
present context because traditional formulations do include
an explicit condition of α–renaming. Also, even if condition
(α) were removed from the definition, other ancillary con-
cepts would still be present.
In order to reach our goals, we now prove a series of
preliminary results.
First, we show that every lambda theory satisfies the con-
dition of extensionality for abstractions discussed in Section
5.
Proposition 7.8. Let ∼ be a lambda theory. Let λxA and
λyB be terms and suppose that [λxA]D ∼ [λyB]D for every
term D. Then, we have λxA ∼ λyB.
Proof. Let z ∈ F(λxA) ∩ F(λyB) ∩ B(λxA) ∩ B(λyB). Then,
we have [λxA]z ∼ [λyB]z. Since F(z) = V \ {z}, z ∈
B(λxA) and z ∈ B(λyB), we have B(λxA) ∪ F(z) = V and
B(λyB) ∪ F(z) = V. So, we can apply (β) and we obtain
[λxA]z ∼ 〈z/x〉(A) and [λyB]z ∼ 〈z/y〉(B). By using (s)
we obtain 〈z/x〉(A) ∼ [λxA]z ∼ [λyB]z ∼ 〈z/y〉(B) and
so λz〈z/x〉(A) ∼ λz〈z/y〉(B) from (t) and (ℓ). Now, since
z ∈ B(λxA) = B(A) \ {x} we obtain z ∈ B(A) and x 6= z.
Similarly, as z ∈ B(λyB) = B(B)\{y} we have z ∈ B(B) and
y 6= z. As z ∈ F(λxA) = F(A) ∪ {x} and x 6= z, it follows
that z ∈ F(A). Analogously, as z ∈ F(λyB) = F(B)∪{y} and
y 6= z, we obtain z ∈ F(B). Hence, we can now apply (α) to
obtain λxA ∼ λz〈z/x〉(A) and λyB ∼ λz〈z/y〉(B). By using
(s) we get λxA ∼ λz〈z/x〉(A) ∼ λz〈z/y〉(B) ∼ λyB and
finally λxA ∼ λyB from (t).
We now establish other technical properties.
Lemma 7.9. Let A be a term, and let y and w be variables.
Then, we have B(〈w/y〉(A)) = B(A).
Proof. We reason by induction on the structure of A.
Suppose that A = z. If y = z, thenwe have B(〈w/y〉(y)) =
B(w) = V = B(y). If y 6= z, then we have B(〈w/y〉(z)) =
B(z).
Suppose that A = BC. By inductive hypothesis, we
have B(〈w/y〉(B)) = B(B) and B(〈w/y〉(C)) = B(C). Then,
it follows that B(〈w/y〉(BC)) = B(〈w/y〉(B)〈w/y〉(C)) =
B(〈w/y〉(B)) ∩ B(〈w/y〉(C)) = B(B) ∩ B(C) = B(BC).
Finally, suppose that A = λzB. If y = z, then we have
B(〈w/y〉(λyB)) = B(λyB). If y 6= z, then, by inductive
hypothesis, we have B(〈w/y〉(B)) = B(B). Hence, it fol-
lows that B(〈w/y〉(λzB)) = B(λz〈w/y〉(B)) = B(〈w/y〉(B))\
{z} = B(B) \ {z} = B(λzB).
Proposition 7.10. Let ∼ be a lambda theory, and let A and
D be terms. Then, there exists a term G such that G ∼ A, and
B(G) ∪ F(D) = V.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of A.
Suppose that A = x. Let G DEF= x. Then, we have G ∼ x by
(r). Since B(G) = V, we have B(G) ∪ F(D) = V.
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Suppose thatA = BC. By inductive hypothesis there exist
M and N such thatM ∼ B and B(M)∪ F(D) = V, as well as
N ∼ C and B(N) ∪ F(D) = V. Let G DEF= MN. Then, we have
G ∼ BC by (a) and B(G)∪ F(D) =
(
B(M)∩ B(N)
)
∪ F(D) =(
B(M) ∪ F(D)
)
∩
(
B(N) ∪ F(D)
)
= V ∩ V = V.
Finally, suppose that A = λyB. By inductive hypothesis,
there exists a termM such thatM ∼ B and B(M)∪ F(D) = V.
Let w ∈ B(M) ∩ F(M) ∩ F(D) and let G DEF= λw〈w/y〉(M). We
have λyM ∼ λyB from (ℓ) and from (α) it follows that
λyM ∼ G, as w ∈ F(M) ∩ B(M). By using (s), we obtain
G ∼ λyM ∼ λyB. Hence, we have G ∼ λyB from (t). In
order to finish the proof, we now show that B(G) ∪ F(D) =
V. For, we have B(G) = B(〈w/y〉(M)) \ {w}. By Lemma
7.9, it follows that B(〈w/y〉(M)) = B(M). Hence, we get
B(G) ∪ F(D) =
(
B(M) \ {w}
)
∪ F(D). Now, observe that(
B(M)\{w}
)
∪ F(D) = B(M)∪ F(D), as w ∈ F(D). From this,
we obtain B(M)∪ F(D) = V by the inductive hypothesis.
Lemma 7.11. Let A and D be terms, and let x and y be vari-
ables such that x 6= y. Then, we have 〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(A)) =
〈y/x〉(A).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of A.
Suppose that A = z. If x = z, then we have
〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(x)) = 〈D/x〉(y) = y = 〈y/x〉(x), as x 6= y. If
x 6= z, then it follows that 〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(z)) = 〈D/x〉(z) =
z = 〈y/x〉(z).
Suppose that A = BC. By inductive hy-
pothesis, we have 〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(B)) = 〈y/x〉(B)
and 〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(C)) = 〈y/x〉(C). Then, we get
〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(BC)) = 〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(B)〈y/x〉(C)) =
〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(B))〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(C)) = 〈y/x〉(B)〈y/x〉(C) =
〈y/x〉(BC).
Finally, suppose that A = λzB. If x = z, then we have
〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(λxB)) = 〈D/x〉(λxB) = λxB = 〈y/x〉(λxB).
If x 6= z, then, by inductive hypothesis, we
have 〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(B)) = 〈y/x〉(B). Then, we
obtain 〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(λzB)) = 〈D/x〉(λz〈y/x〉(B))
= λz〈D/x〉(〈y/x〉(B)) = λz〈y/x〉(B) = 〈y/x〉(λzB).
8 Lambda and Extensional Theories
Revisited
In this section, we finally prove that the notions of lambda
and extensional congruence are respectively equivalent to
the concepts of lambda and extensional theory. To begin
with, we show in the next proposition that prelambda con-
gruences behave well with respect to condition (β).
Proposition 8.1. Let ∼ be a prelambda congruence. Let x be
a variable, and let A and D be terms such that B(A)∪ F(D) =
V. Then, we have [λxA]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(A).
Proof. We reason by induction on the structure of A.
Suppose that A = y. If x = y, then we have 〈D/x〉(x) = D
and it follows that [λxx]D ∼ D from (β1). If x 6= y, then we
have 〈D/x〉(y) = y and we obtain [λxy]D ∼ y by (β2).
Suppose that A = BC. Since B(A) ⊆ B(B), B(A) ⊆ B(C)
and B(A) ∪ F(D) = V, we have B(B) ∪ F(D) = V and
B(C)∪ F(D) = V. Hence, by inductive hypothesis, it follows
that [λxB]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(B) and [λxC]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(C). From
this, we get [[λxB]D][[λxC]D] ∼ 〈D/x〉(B)〈D/x〉(C) from
(a). Now, by (β3) we have [λx[BC]]D ∼ [[λxB]D][[λxC]D],
and we obtain [λx[BC]]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(B)〈D/x〉(C) from (t). As
〈D/x〉(B)〈D/x〉(C) = 〈D/x〉(BC), we conclude.
Finally, suppose that A = λyB. If x = y, then we have
〈D/x〉(λxB) = λxB and we obtain [λx[λxB]]D ∼ λxB by
(β4). If x 6= y, then we have y /∈ B(B) \ {y} = B(A). Since
B(A) ∪ F(D) = V, it follows that y ∈ F(D). As x 6= y, we ob-
tain [λx[λyB]]D ∼ λy[[λxB]D] by Proposition 4.6(ii). Since
B(A) ⊆ B(B) and B(A)∪ F(D) = V, we have B(B)∪ F(D) = V.
By inductive hypothesis, we get [λxB]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(B). From
this, we obtain λy[[λxB]D] ∼ λy〈D/x〉(B) from (ℓ) and
[λx[λyB]]D ∼ λy〈D/x〉(B) from (t). Since λy〈D/x〉(B) =
〈D/x〉(λyB), we conclude.
We are now in a position to prove the main results of this
section.
Proposition 8.2. Every lambda congruence is a lambda the-
ory.
Proof. Let ∼ be an lambda congruence. In order to prove
that ∼ is a lambda theory we only have to show that ∼
satisfies conditions (β) and (α).
(β) Suppose that B(A) ∪ F(D) = V. Since every lambda
congruence is also a prelambda congruence, we obtain
[λxA]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(A) by Proposition 8.1.
(α) Suppose that y ∈ F(A) ∩ B(A). As y ∈ F(A), we
have λxA ∼ λy[[λxA]y] by Proposition 5.4(ii). As y ∈ B(A)
and F(y) = V \ {y}, we have B(A) ∪ F(y) = V. By Propo-
sition 8.1, it follows that [λxA]y ∼ 〈y/x〉(A), and we get
λy[[λxA]y] ∼ λy〈y/x〉(A) from (ℓ). Then, we conclude that
λxA ∼ λy〈y/x〉(A) from (t).
Proposition 8.3. Every lambda theory is a lambda congru-
ence.
Proof. Let ∼ be a lambda theory. By Theorem 5.5, in order
to prove that ∼ is a lambda congruence all we have to
show is that ∼ is a prelambda congruence which satisfy
the condition of extensionality for abstractions (ea).
(β1) Since B(x) = V, we have B(x) ∪ F(D) = V. As
〈D/x〉(x) = D, we obtain [λxx]D ∼ D by (β).
(β2) Suppose that x 6= y. Since B(y) = V, we have B(y)∪
F(D) = V. As 〈D/x〉(y) = y, we have [λxy]D ∼ y by (β).
(β3) By Proposition 7.10, there exist some terms M and
N such thatM ∼ A and B(M)∪ F(D) = V, as well as N ∼ B
and B(N) ∪ F(D) = V. We have MN ∼ AB by (a) and
B(MN) ∪ F(D) =
(
B(M) ∩ B(N)
)
∪ F(D) =
(
B(M) ∪ F(D)
)
∩(
B(N) ∪ F(D)
)
= V ∩ V = V. For E ∈ {A,B,AB}, let
F
DEF
=


M if E = A
N if E = B
MN if E = AB .
Suppose that E ∈ {A,B,AB}. Since F ∼ E, we have
λxF ∼ λxE by (ℓ). From (r), we have D ∼ D and so
we get [λxF]D ∼ [λxE]D by (a). Since B(F) ∪ F(D) = V
we have [λxF]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(F) from (β). By using (s),
we obtain [λxE]D ∼ [λxF]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(F). Hence, we
have [λxE]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(F) from (t). This shows that
[λxA]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(M), [λxB]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(N) and [λx[AB]]D ∼
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〈D/x〉(MN). Now, as 〈D/x〉(M)〈D/x〉(N) = 〈D/x〉(MN), we
obtain [[λxA]D][[λxB]D] ∼ 〈D/x〉(MN) by (a). By using (s),
we have [λx[AB]]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(MN) ∼ [[λxA]D][[λxB]D]. From
(t) we finally obtain [λx[AB]]D ∼ [[λxA]D][[λxB]D].
(β4) By Proposition 7.10, there exists a term G such
that G ∼ A and B(G) ∪ F(D) = V. Let w ∈ F(G) ∩
B(G) ∩ F(D) ∩ (V \ {x}) and let M DEF= λw〈w/x〉(G). Since
w ∈ F(G) ∩ B(G) it follows that λxG ∼ M from (α).
By using (ℓ) and (s), we obtain λx[λxA] ∼ λx[λxG] and
λx[λxG] ∼ λxM. From (r), we have D ∼ D and so we get
[λx[λxA]]D ∼ [λx[λxG]]D and [λx[λxG]]D ∼ [λxM]D by (a).
By Lemma 7.9, we have B(〈w/x〉(G)) = B(G). Hence, it fol-
lows that B(M) = B(〈w/x〉(G)) \ {w} = B(G) \ {w}. Since
w ∈ F(D) and B(G) ∪ F(D) = V, we have B(M) ∪ F(D) =(
B(G) \ {w}
)
∪ F(D) = B(G) ∪ F(D) = V. From this, we
obtain [λxM]D ∼ 〈D/x〉(M) by (β). As x 6= w, we have
〈D/x〉(M) = 〈D/x〉(λw〈w/x〉(G)) = λw〈D/x〉(〈w/x〉(G)),
and we get 〈D/x〉(〈w/x〉(G)) = 〈w/x〉(G) by Lemma 7.11.
Hence, we obtain 〈D/x〉(M) = λw〈w/x〉(G) = M and
[λxM]D ∼ M. Since G ∼ A, we obtain λxG ∼ λxA from
(ℓ) and by using (s) we have [λx[λxA]]D ∼ [λx[λxG]]D ∼
[λxM]D ∼ M ∼ λxG ∼ λxA. From (t), we finally obtain
[λx[λxA]]D ∼ λxA.
(β5) Suppose that x 6= y and [λyD]x ∼ D. Let C
DEF
=
[λyD]x. By Proposition 7.10, there exists a term G such that
G ∼ A and B(G) ∪ F(C) = V. Since B(G) ∪ F(C) = V, we
have [λxG]C ∼ 〈C/x〉(G) by (β). As G ∼ A, we have
λxG ∼ λxA by (ℓ). From this and C ∼ D we obtain
[λxG]C ∼ [λxA]D by (a). By using (s), we have 〈C/x〉(G) ∼
[λxG]C ∼ [λxA]D and we obtain 〈C/x〉(G) ∼ [λxA]D from
(t). Hence, we get λy〈C/x〉(G) ∼ λy[[λxA]D] by (ℓ). Now,
since G ∼ A, we have λx[λyG] ∼ λx[λyA] by using (ℓ).
As C ∼ D, we get [λx[λyG]]C ∼ [λx[λyA]]D by (a). Since
x 6= y, we have y ∈
(
F(D) ∪ {y}
)
∩
(
V \ {x}
)
= F(λyD) ∩
F(x) = F([λyD]x) = F(C). From this and B(G)∪ F(C) = V it
follows that B(λyG) ∪ F(C) =
(
B(G) \ {y}
)
∪ F(C) = B(G) ∪
F(C) = V. Hence, we obtain [λx[λyG]]C ∼ 〈C/x〉(λyG) by
(β). Since x 6= y, we have 〈C/x〉(λyG) = λy〈C/x〉(G). Thus,
we get [λx[λyG]]D ∼ λy〈C/x〉(G). By using (s) we obtain
[λx[λyA]]D ∼ [λx[λyG]]C ∼ λy〈C/x〉(G) ∼ λy[[λxA]D].
Hence, we conclude that [λx[λyA]]D ∼ λy[[λxA]D] from
(t).
(ea) This condition holds by Proposition 7.8.
Proposition 8.4. Every extensional congruence is an exten-
sional theory.
Proof. Let ∼ be an extensional congruence. In order to
prove that ∼ is an extensional theory we have to show
that ∼ satisfies conditions (β), (α) and (η). By Theorem
6.3 we know that ∼ is a lambda congruence and so by
Proposition 8.2 it satisfies (β) and (α). As for (η), it holds
by Proposition 6.2(ii).
Proposition 8.5. Every extensional theory is an extensional
congruence.
Proof. Let ∼ be an extensional theory. In order to prove
that ∼ is an extensional congruence we have to show that
∼ satisfies all beta conditions and (ηe). Since, by definition,
∼ is also a lambda theory, we know by Proposition 8.3 that
∼ satisfies all beta conditions. As for (ηe), suppose that
x 6= y. Then, as x ∈ V \ {y} = F(y), we obtain y ∼ λx[yx]
by (η).
Theorem 8.6. The concepts of lambda and extensional con-
gruence are respectively equivalent to the notions of lambda
and extensional theory.
Proof. By the previous four propositions.
By using the above theorem, it is also possible to give
simplified formalizations of lambda conversion and exten-
sional conversion as we now explain.
Recall that lambda conversion is the lambda theory in-
ductively defined by using structural conditions, (β) and
(α). In other words, lambda conversion is the intersec-
tion of all lambda theories. By Theorem 8.6, the set of
all lambda theories is equal to the set of all lambda con-
gruences. Thus, lambda conversion is also the intersection
of all lambda congruences. In particular, lambda conver-
sion can be equivalently characterized as the relation in-
ductively defined by using all structural and beta conditions
together with (αe).
By replacing (αe) by (ηe) in the discussion above, a sim-
plified axiomatization of extensional conversion is similarly
given.
9 The Prelambda Congruence ∼I
The aim of this section is to show that there exists a
prelambda congruence ∼I such that for all distinct vari-
ables x and y we have λxx 6∼I λyy. In other words, we now
prove Theorem 3.3 whose proof was omitted in Section 3.
This is not an easy task, though. The reason is that
the defining conditions of prelambda congruence only deal
with “provability” while our aim is to show the “unprovabil-
ity” of λxx ∼I λyy, that is λxx 6∼I λyy.
A reassuring fact is that similar situations frequently hap-
pen in logic and in that setting well–known methods to
solve these kinds of problems are available. Consider for
instance intuitionistic theories and the law of excluded mid-
dle — for the purposes of this discussion an intuitionistic
theory is just a set of formulas which is closed under the
rules of intuitionistic logic. We say that an intuitionistic
theory is classical if it contain every instance of excluded
middle. Of course, there are several intuitionistic theories
which are classical: classical logic is the primary example.
Suppose that we want to show that there exists an intu-
itionistic theory which is not classical. In order to do this,
it suffices to construct a modelM and prove that the set of
formulas which are valid in M forms a non–classical intu-
itionistic theory. Note that M cannot be a standard model
of classical logic — excluded middle never fails there— but
it has to be a model specifically designed to this aim, such as
a topological model or a Kripke model; see, e.g., Sørensen
and Urzyczyn [47, Ch. 2].
Now, if we think of prelambda congruences as intuition-
istic theories and “λxx ∼ λyy for all x and y” as the law
of excluded middle, then the situation is strikingly similar
to the one described above. Hence, in order to solve our
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problem we now build a kind of model with the required
properties. Since all models considered in the literature of
the lambda calculus have been conceived for the purpose
of validating (not refuting) “λxx ∼ λyy for all x and y”,
our construction, to the best of our knowledge, seems to be
new.
We now introduce some notation. Let A and B be sets.
We writeB ⊆f A to express the fact thatB is a finite subset
ofA. We also write P (A) and Pf (A) for the set of all subsets
and finite subsets of A, respectively. Furthermore, we write
A×B to denote the Cartesian product of A and B.
In order to construct our model we now introduce the
notion of formula.
Definition 9.1 (Formula). Let F be the set inductively de-
fined as follows:
(F1) x ∈ V implies x ∈ F;
(F2) F ⊆f F and ℓ ∈ F imply (F, ℓ) ∈ F.
We call formula any element of the set F. Henceforth,
we use F , G, H ,. . . and ℓ, m, n, . . . to denote finite subsets
and elements of F, respectively. We also use the expression
F ⊢ ℓ as an alternative notation for the ordered pair (F, ℓ).
In particular, we write G ⊢ F ⊢ ℓ for (G, (F, ℓ)).
Let ℓ be a formula. We say that ℓ is an atomic formula
if ℓ ∈ V and that ℓ is a compound formula if ℓ /∈ V; equiv-
alently, if it is of the form F ⊢ m. △
We now observe that our set F belongs to the class of
structures called graph algebras, in the terminology of En-
geler [23]. In particular, F corresponds to the full graph
algebra G(V) built on the set of variables V. For our aims
the fact that F is specifically constructed out of the set of
variables V turns out to be essential, as we make clear later.
Graph algebras are also known as Engeler models and PSE–
algebras in the literature; see, e.g., Meyer [33], Longo [31],
Barendregt [5], Krivine [30], Plotkin [39], Berline [6, 7]
and Hindley and Seldin [26]. Regarding our terminology,
we refer to elements F as formulas because a similar termi-
nology is employed in [30] for similar structures.
Our aim is to interpret terms using the structure we have
just defined. In order to do so, it is necessary to introduce
the concepts of environment and update first.
Definition 9.2 (Environment, update). We call environ-
ment any function σ from V to Pf (F). In the sequel, we
use σ, ρ, τ , . . . to denote environments. We also denote the
set of all environments by E.
Let σ be an environment. Let x ∈ V and let F ⊆f F. We
denote by {F/x}σ the environment given by:
{F/x}σ(y)
DEF
=
{
F if x = y
σ(y) if x 6= y , for y ∈ V .
We call {F/x}σ an update of σ.
Let x and y be variables, and let F and G in Pf (F). Let σ
be an environment. If ρ = {F/x}σ and τ = {G/y}ρ, then
we also write τ as {G/y}{F/x}σ. △
Updates obey the algebraic laws that we show in the next
lemma.
Lemma 9.3. Let σ be an environment. Let x and y be vari-
ables such that x 6= y, and let F and G be finite subsets of F.
Then, the following properties hold:
(i) {G/x}{F/x}σ = {G/x}σ;
(ii) {G/y}{F/x}σ = {F/x}{G/y}σ.
Proof. (i) We have {G/x}{F/x}σ(x) = G = {G/x}σ(x).
Let z be a variable such that x 6= z. Then, we have
{G/x}{F/x}σ(z) = {F/x}σ(z) = σ(z) = {G/x}σ(z).
(ii) Since x 6= y, we have {G/y}{F/x}σ(x) =
{F/x}σ(x) = F = {F/x}{G/y}σ(x) and
{G/y}{F/x}σ(y) = G = {G/y}σ(y) = {F/x}{G/y}σ(y).
Let z be a variable such that x 6= z and y 6= z. Then, we have
{G/y}{F/x}σ(z) = {F/x}σ(z) = σ(z) = {G/y}σ(z) =
{F/x}{G/y}σ(z).
We now define our interpretation of terms. As is stan-
dard for graph algebras, each term is interpreted via an
environment as a subset of formulas.
Definition 9.4 (Interpretation of terms in P (F)). We de-
fine the function I from T×E to P (F) by induction on the
structure of terms as follows:
(I1) I(x, σ)
DEF
= σ(x);
(I2) I(AB, σ)
DEF
= {ℓ | there exists F ⊆f I(B, σ) such that
F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(A, σ)};
(I3) I(λxA, σ)
DEF
= {F ⊢ m | m ∈ I(A, {F/x}σ)} ∪ {x}.
Let A and B be terms. We write A ∼I B and say that A
and B have the same interpretation in P (F) if I(A, σ) =
I(B, σ) for every environment σ. We also call the relation
∼I the theory of P (F). △
While our set F is just an example of graph algebra, our
interpretation of terms in P (F) is definitely non–standard,
as we now explain.
Firstly, environments are usually taken as function from
V to P (F) and not as functions from V to Pf (F) as we do
in this paper. The reason is practical: to show our results
we found it is not necessary consider environments having
infinite sets of formulas in their range.
Secondly, following the standard interpretation of terms
in graph algebras I(λxA, σ) should be the set of formu-
las {F ⊢ m | m ∈ I(A, {F/x}σ)} and not our set {F ⊢
m | m ∈ I(A, {F/x}σ)} ∪ {x}. As a consequence of this
fact, in our setting each set of the form I(λxA, σ) contains
compound formulas of the form F ⊢ m and exactly one
atomic formula, namely x. This formula x gives us a “tag”
for the “λx” in the interpretation of λxA and the presence of
this unique atomic formula turns out to be crucial for our
purposes. For this reason, the fact that variables are also
formulas is very important in our setting.
We now show two lemmas that we need during the proof
of Theorem 9.7.
Lemma 9.5. Let x be a variable and let A be a term. Let F
andG finite subsets of of formulas such thatF ⊆ G. Then, for
every environment σ we have I(A, {F/x}σ) ⊆ I(A, {G/x}σ).
Proof. We reason by induction on the structure of A. Let σ
be an environment and let ℓ be a formula.
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Suppose that A = y. If x = y, then we have
I(x, {F/x}σ) = {F/x}σ(x) = F ⊆ G = {G/x}σ(x) =
I(x, {G/x}σ). If x 6= y, then we have I(y, {F/x}σ) =
{F/x}σ(y) = σ(y) = {G/x}σ(y) = I(y, {G/x}σ).
Suppose that A = BC. By inductive hypothesis, for
every environment ρ and every D ∈ {B,C} we have
I(D, {F/x}ρ) ⊆ I(D, {G/x}ρ). Assume ℓ ∈ I(BC, {F/x}σ).
Then, there exists H ⊆f I(C, {F/x}σ) such that H ⊢
ℓ ∈ I(B, {F/x}σ). By inductive hypothesis, it follows that
H ⊆f I(C, {G/x}σ) and H ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(B, {G/x}σ). From this,
we conclude that ℓ ∈ I(BC, {G/x}σ).
Suppose that A = λyB. Assume ℓ ∈ I(λyB, {F/x}σ).
Suppose that x = y. If ℓ = x, then we obviously have x ∈
I(λxB, {G/x}σ). Otherwise, it follows that ℓ = H ⊢ m for
someH andm such thatm ∈ I(B, {H/x}{F/x}σ). By using
Lemma 9.3(i) it follows that m ∈ I(B, {H/x}{G/x}σ) and
we obtain H ⊢ m ∈ I(λxB, {G/x}σ). Suppose now that
x 6= y. If ℓ = y, then we clearly have y ∈ I(λyB, {G/x}σ).
Otherwise, it follows that ℓ = H ⊢ m for some H and
m such that m ∈ I(B, {H/y}{F/x}σ). By inductive hy-
pothesis, for every environment ρ we have I(B, {F/x}ρ) ⊆
I(B, {G/x}ρ). From this and Lemma 9.3(ii) we ob-
tain m ∈ I(B, {H/y}{F/x}σ) = I(B, {F/x}{H/y}σ) ⊆
I(B, {G/x}{H/y}σ) = I(B, {H/y}{G/x}σ), as x 6= y.
Therefore, we get H ⊢ m ∈ I(λyB, {G/x}σ).
Lemma 9.6. Let x and z be variables such that x 6= z, and
let A be a term. Let F be a finite subset of formulas. Suppose
that [λxA]z ∼I A. Then, we have I(A, σ) = I(A, {F/x}σ) for
every environment σ.
Proof. Let σ be an environment and let ℓ be a formula.
As [λxA]z ∼I A, we have I([λxA]z, σ) = I(A, σ) and
I([λxA]z, {F/x}σ) = I(A, {F/x}σ).
Assume ℓ ∈ I(A, σ) = I([λxA]z, σ). Then, there ex-
ists G ⊆f I(z, σ) such that G ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λxA, σ) and
ℓ ∈ I(A, {G/x}σ). Since x 6= z, it follows that G ⊆f
I(z, σ) = σ(z) = {F/x}σ(z) = I(z, {F/x}σ). By using
Lemma 9.3(i), it follows that ℓ ∈ I(A, {G/x}{F/x}σ) and
hence G ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λxA, {F/x}σ). Since G ⊆f I(z, {F/x}σ),
we obtain ℓ ∈ I([λxA]z, {F/x}σ) = I(A, {F/x}σ). This
shows that I(A, σ) ⊆ I(A, {F/x}σ). To show the opposite
inclusion, assume ℓ ∈ I(A, {F/x}σ) = I([λxA]z, σ{F/x}).
Then, there exists some G ⊆f I(z, σ{F/x}) such that
G ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λxA, {F/x}σ) and ℓ ∈ I(A, {G/x}{F/x}σ).
By using Lemma 9.3(i), we get ℓ ∈ I(A, {G/x}σ). So,
we have G ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λxA, σ). As x 6= z, we get G ⊆f
I(z, {F/x}σ) = {F/x}σ(z) = σ(z) = I(z, σ) and we ob-
tain ℓ ∈ I([λxA]z, σ) = I(A, σ). Therefore, we have
I(A, {F/x}σ) ⊆ I(A, σ).
We can nowprove the theory of our model is a prelambda
congruence.
Theorem 9.7. The relation ∼I is a prelambda congruence.
Proof. All we have to do is to check that ∼I satisfies all
structural and beta conditions. Let σ be an environment
and let ℓ be a formula.
As for (r), (s) and (t), let ρ be and environment. Since
I(D, ρ) is a set for each term D, the following conditions
hold: I(A, ρ) = I(A, ρ), I(A, ρ) = I(B, ρ) implies I(B, ρ) =
I(A, ρ), I(A, ρ) = I(B, ρ) and I(B, ρ) = I(C, ρ) imply
I(A, ρ) = I(C, ρ). From this observation, the fact that ∼I
satisfies (r), (s) and (t) follows.
(ℓ) Suppose that I(A, ρ) = I(B, ρ) for every environment
ρ. We have to show that I(λxA, σ) = I(λxB, σ). For M ∈
{A,B}, let
N
DEF
=
{
B if M = A
A if M = B .
Suppose that ℓ ∈ I(λxM, σ). If ℓ = x, then we clearly have
x ∈ I(λxN, σ). Otherwise, it follows that ℓ = F ⊢ m for
some F and m such that and m ∈ I(M, {F/x}σ). Since
I(A, {F/x}σ) = I(B, {F/x}σ), we have I(M, {F/x}σ) =
I(N, {F/x}σ) and hence m ∈ I(N, {F/x}σ). From this,
we conclude that F ⊢ m ∈ I(λxN, σ). This shows that
I(λxA, σ) = I(λxB, σ).
(a) Suppose that I(A, ρ) = I(B, ρ) for every environment
ρ and I(C, τ) = I(D, τ) for every environment τ . We have
to show that I(AC, σ) = I(BD, σ). For MM′ ∈ {AC,BD},
let
NN′
DEF
=
{
BD if MM′ = AC
AC if MM′ = BD .
Suppose that ℓ ∈ I(MM′, σ). Then, there exists F ⊆f
I(M′, σ) such that F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(M, σ). Since I(A, σ) = I(B, σ)
and I(C, σ) = I(D, σ), it follows that I(M, σ) = I(N, σ)
and I(M′, σ) = I(N′, σ). Thus, we have F ⊆f I(N′, σ) and
F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(N, σ). So, it follows that ℓ ∈ I(NN′, σ). This
proves that I(AC, σ) = I(BD, σ).
(β1) We have to show that I([λxx]D, σ) = I(D, σ). Sup-
pose that ℓ ∈ I([λxx]D, σ). Then, there exists F ⊆f
I(D, σ) such that F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λxx, σ). Since we have
ℓ ∈ I(x, {F/x}σ) = {F/x}σ(x) = F , we conclude that
ℓ ∈ F ⊆f I(D, σ). To show the opposite inclusion, sup-
pose now that ℓ ∈ I(D, σ). Let F DEF= {ℓ}. Since ℓ ∈ F =
{F/x}σ(x) = I(x, {F/x}σ), we have F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λxx, σ). As
F = {ℓ}, it follows that F ⊆f I(D, σ). Thus, we obtain
ℓ ∈ I([λxx]D, σ).
(β2) Suppose that x 6= y. We have to show that
I([λxy]D, σ) = I(y, σ). Assume ℓ ∈ I([λxy]D, σ). Then,
there exists F ⊆f I(D, σ) such that F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λxy, σ).
Since x 6= y, we have ℓ ∈ I(y, {F/x}σ) = {F/x}σ(y) =
σ(y) = I(y, σ). As for the opposite inclusion, assume now
ℓ ∈ I(y, σ). Since x 6= y, we have I(y, σ) = σ(y) =
{∅/x}σ(y) = I(y, {∅/x}σ). Thus, we have ℓ ∈ I(y, {∅/x}σ)
and ∅ ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λxy, σ). As ∅ ⊆f I(D, σ), we get ℓ ∈
I([λxy]D, σ).
(β3) We have to show that I([λx[AB]]D, σ) =
I([[λxA]D][[λxB]D], σ). Suppose that ℓ ∈ I([λx[AB]]D, σ).
Then, there exists F ⊆f I(D, σ) such that
F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λx[AB], σ). From this, we obtain
ℓ ∈ I(AB, {F/x}σ). Thus, there exists G ⊆f I(B, {F/x}σ)
such that G ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(A, {F/x}σ). Hence, we have
F ⊢ G ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λxA, σ). Since F ⊆f I(D, σ), we
obtain G ⊢ ℓ ∈ I([λxA]D, σ). Let n ∈ G. Since
n ∈ I(B, {F/x}σ), it follows that F ⊢ n ∈ I(λxB, σ). Since
F ⊆f I(D, σ), we have n ∈ I([λxB]D, σ). Thus, we have
G ⊆f I([λxB]D, σ). Now, as G ⊢ ℓ ∈ I([λxA]D, σ), we
obtain ℓ ∈ I([[λxA]D][[λxB]D], σ). To show the opposite in-
clusion, suppose now that ℓ ∈ I([[λxA]D][[λxB]D], σ).
Then, there exists F ⊆f I([λxB]D, σ) such that
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F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I([λxA]D, σ). Let m ∈ F . Since m ∈ I([λxB]D, σ),
there exists Gm ⊆f I(D, σ) such that Gm ⊢ m ∈ I(λxB, σ).
From this, we obtain m ∈ I(B, {Gm/x}σ). Now, as
F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I([λxA]D, σ), there exists H ⊆f I(D, σ) such
that H ⊢ F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λxA, σ). From this, we obtain
F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(A, {H/x}σ). Let
L
DEF
= {n | n ∈ Gm for some m ∈ F} ∪H
and note that it is a finite set of formulas. Letm ∈ F . Since
Gm ⊆ L we obtainm ∈ I(B, {Gm/x}σ) ⊆ I(B, {L/x}σ) by
Lemma 9.5 and therefore F ⊆f I(B, {L/x}σ). As H ⊆ L,
it follows from Lemma 9.5 that F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(A, {H/x}σ) ⊆
I(A, {L/x}σ). So, we obtain ℓ ∈ I(AB, {L/x}σ) and L ⊢
ℓ ∈ I(λx[AB], σ). Since Gm ⊆f I(D, σ) for every m and
H ⊆f I(D, σ), it follows that L ⊆f I(D, σ). As L ⊢ ℓ ∈
I(λx[AB], σ), we finally obtain ℓ ∈ I([λx[AB]]D, σ).
(β4) We have to show that I([λx[λxA]]D, σ) = I(λxA, σ).
Suppose that ℓ ∈ I([λx[λxA]]D, σ). Then, there exists
F ⊆f I(D, σ) such that F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λx[λxA], σ). We also
have ℓ ∈ I(λxA, {F/x}σ). If ℓ = x, then we clearly have
x ∈ I(λxA, σ). Otherwise, it follows that ℓ = G ⊢ m for
some G and m such that m ∈ I(A, {G/x}{F/x}σ). By us-
ing Lemma 9.3(i), we obtain m ∈ I(A, {G/x}{F/x}σ) =
I(A, {G/x}σ) and hence G ⊢ m ∈ I(λxA, σ). As for the op-
posite inclusion, suppose now that ℓ ∈ I(λxA, σ). If ℓ = x,
we also have x ∈ I(λxA, {∅/x}σ). From this, we obtain
∅ ⊢ x ∈ I(λx[λxA], σ). Since ∅ ⊆f I(D, σ) it follows that x ∈
I([λx[λxA]]D, σ). Otherwise, we have ℓ = F ⊢ m for some
F and m such that m ∈ I(A, {F/x}σ). By using Lemma
9.3(i), we obtain m ∈ I(A, {F/x}σ) = I(A, {F/x}{∅/x}σ)
and we get ℓ ∈ I(λxA, {∅/x}σ) and ∅ ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λx[λxA], σ).
Since ∅ ⊆f I(D, σ), we then have ℓ ∈ I([λx[λxA]]D, σ).
(β5) Suppose that x 6= y and [λyD]x ∼I D. We now
show that I([λx[λyA]]D, σ) = I(λy[[λxA]D], σ). Assume
ℓ ∈ I([λx[λyA]]D, σ). Then, there exists F ⊆f I(D, σ)
such that F ⊢ ℓ ∈ I(λx[λyA], σ). From this, it follows that
ℓ ∈ I(λyA, {F/x}σ). If ℓ = y, then we obviously have y ∈
I(λy[[λxA]D], σ). Otherwise, we have ℓ = G ⊢ m for some
G and m such that m ∈ I(A, {G/y}{F/x}σ). Since x 6= y,
by using Lemma 9.3(ii) we obtainm ∈ I(A, {F/x}{G/y}σ).
So, we get F ⊢ m ∈ I(λxA, {G/y}σ). Since [λyD]x ∼I D,
we have I(D, σ) = I(D, {G/y}σ) by Lemma 9.6. Since
F ⊆f I(D, σ), we have F ⊆f I(D, {G/y}σ). Now, as F ⊢
m ∈ I(λxA, {G/y}σ), we obtain m ∈ I([λxA]D, {G/y}σ).
Thus, we conclude thatG ⊢ m ∈ I(λy[[λxA]D], σ). To show
the opposite inclusion, assume now ℓ ∈ I(λy[[λxA]D], σ). If
ℓ = y, then we also have y ∈ I(λyA, {∅/x}σ). From this, we
obtain ∅ ⊢ y ∈ I(λx[λyA], σ). Since ∅ ⊆f I(D, σ), it follows
that y ∈ I([λx[λyA]]D, σ). Otherwise, we have ℓ = F ⊢
m for some F and m such that m ∈ I([λxA]D, {F/y}σ).
Furthermore, there exists G ⊆f I(D, {F/y}σ) such that
G ⊢ m ∈ I(λxA, {F/y}σ). From this, we obtain m ∈
I(A, {G/x}{F/y}σ). Since x 6= y, we can apply Lemma
9.3(ii) and we get m ∈ I(A, {F/y}{G/x}σ). From this,
we obtain F ⊢ m ∈ I(λyA, {G/x}σ) and G ⊢ F ⊢ m ∈
I(λx[λyA], σ). Since [λyD]x ∼I D, we have I(D, σ) =
I(D, {F/y}σ) by Lemma 9.6. SinceG ⊆f I(D, {F/y}σ), we
have G ⊆f I(D, σ). Now, since G ⊢ F ⊢ m ∈ I(λx[λyA], σ),
we finally obtain F ⊢ m ∈ I([λx[λyA]]D, σ).
The proof of the theorem is now complete.
We can now prove Theorem 3.3 as follows. By Theorem
9.7, the relation ∼I is a prelambda congruence. Now, let x
and y two variables such that x 6= y. Let σ be an environ-
ment. We have x ∈ I(λxx, σ) and x /∈ I(λyy, σ), as x 6= y
and y is the only atomic formula in I(λyy, σ). This shows
that λxx 6∼I λyy.
10 Conclusions and Some Direc-
tions for Future Work
In this workwe have obtained alternative and simplified for-
mulations of the concepts of lambda theory and extensional
theory without introducing the meta–theoretic notion of
substitution and the conceptually inelegant sets of all, free
and bound variables occurring in a term. We have also clar-
ified the actual role of α–renaming and η–extensionality in
the lambda calculus: from a convenient point of view —
our prelambda congruences — both of them can be equiv-
alently described as properties of extensionality for certain
classes of terms.
Our proof of the elimination of the ancillary concepts is
rather technical, but conceptually speaking very simple. We
also point out that in the relevant literature discussed in
Section 1 we could not find complete and detailed proofs of
results similar to those we proved in Section 8 and Section
9. For this reason — and also because we want to make
the article readable by a wider audience — we decided to
make our exposition self–contained as much as possible.
As for future work, we plan to apply the ideas we fol-
lowed in this paper to other contexts. For instance, we
would like to provide similar formalizations of various no-
tions of derivability (of formulas and sequents) for several
first– and higher–order logics and theories. As already ob-
served by Révész [41], some results for derivability in clas-
sical first–order logic with equality which are in line with
our motivations — the elimination of some meta–theoretic
notions included in our ancillary concepts — have been al-
ready established by Tarski [51], Kalish andMontague [28]
and Monk [34]. Similar results for second–order classic
logic have been established by Cocchiarella [14]. But in our
opinion, the most satisfactory axiomatization of first–order
classical logic with equality, due to Németi, is reported in
the book of Blok and Pigozzi [9, App. C]. In contrast to
the aforementionedwork, the formulation described in that
book has the pleasant property of being completely free of
ancillary concepts.
We believe that there is a more uniform way to tackle
the problem of eliminating the ancillary concepts from sev-
eral logics, as we now intuitively explain. It is well–known
that substitution — which is usually introduced as a tool
for developing the proof–theory of the quantifiers— can be
completely handled by the lambda notation, as in Church’s
theory of simple types [12]. This theory can be seen as (an
extension of) classical higher–order logic and we refer to
Coquand [16, Sec. 1] for a very elegant presentation of its
purely logical part in an intuitionistic setting. We think that
the ideas and the approach employed in the present article
can be exploited to remove the ancillary concepts — which
have no mathematical and logical substance — from logic
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and hence simplify the presentations of intuitionistic and
classical higher–order logics.
We also plan to export our ideas to give new presenta-
tions of some frameworks based on the lambda calculus
(without types) whose aim is to formalize (considerable
parts of) mathematics such as the type–free systems intro-
duced by Myhill and Flagg [35] and map theory, a setting
originally introduced by Grue and recently simplified by
Berline and Grue [8].
Finally, we also believe that some ideas we have intro-
duced in this paper can be useful to develop another ap-
proach to lambda calculi with explicit substitutions, see
Abadi, Cardelli, Curien and Lévi [1] and also Kesner [29]
for a brief survey. Our suggestion is to internalize substitu-
tions as in the theory of lambda substitution algebras, the
algebraic framework introduced by Diskin and Beylin [21]
discussed in Section 3. The expected advantage should be
the following: no ancillary concept other than substitution
— which is not a meta–theoretic notion in that context —
would appear in the formalizations of lambda and exten-
sional theories in systems with explicit substitutions.
More generally, we believe that the algebraic approach
to binding operations, see Cardone and Hindley [10, p.
736] for a brief survey, has been relatively overlooked by
the computer science community — exceptions are, of
course, lambda abstraction and lambda substitution alge-
bras. While the primary goals of those lines of work, namely
representation theorems, are perhapsmore palatable to alge-
braists than computer scientists, we think that the study of
the algebraic approach to quantification can be very useful
for the developments of better syntactical formalizations of
theories in structures with binding operations.
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